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Abstract
With the rapid increase of network-enabled sensors, switches, and relays, cyber-physical
system security in the smart grid has become important. The smart grid operation demands reliable
communication. Existing encryption technologies ensures the authenticity of delivered messages.
However, commonly applied technologies are not able to prevent the delay or drop of smart grid
communication messages.
In this dissertation, the author focuses on the network security vulnerabilities in synchropha-
sor network and their mitigation methods. Side-channel vulnerabilities of the synchrophasor network
are identified. Synchrophasor network is one of the most important technologies in the smart grid
transmission system. Experiments presented in this dissertation shows that a DoS attack that ex-
ploits the side-channel vulnerability against the synchrophasor network can lead to the power system
in stability.
Side-channel analysis extracts information by observing implementation artifacts without
knowing the actual meaning of the information. Synchrophasor network consist of Phasor Measure-
ment Units (PMUs) use synchrophasor protocol to transmit measurement data. Two side-channels
are discovered in the synchrophasor protocol. Side-channel analysis based Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks differentiate the source of multiple PMU data streams within an encrypted tunnel and only
drop selected PMU data streams. Simulations on a power system shows that, without any counter-
measure, a power system can be subverted after an attack. Then, mitigation methods from both
the network and power grid perspectives are carried out.
Form the perspective of network security study, side-channel analysis, and protocol trans-
formation has the potential to assist the PMU communication to evade attacks lead with protocol
identifications.
Form the perspective of power grid control study, to mitigate PMU DoS attacks, Cellular
ii
Computational Network (CCN) prediction of PMU data is studied and used to implement a Virtual
Synchrophasor Network (VSN), which learns and mimics the behaviors of an objective power grid.
The data from VSN is used by the Automatic Generation Controllers (AGCs) when the PMU packets
are disrupted by DoS attacks. Real-time experimental results show the CCN based VSN effectively
inferred the missing data and mitigated the negative impacts of DoS attacks.
In this study, industry-standard hardware PMUs and Real-Time Digital Power System
Simulator (RTDS) are used to build experimental environments that are as close to actual production
as possible for this research.
The above-mentioned attack and mitigation methods are also tested on the Internet. Man-
In-The-Middle (MITM) attack of PMU traffic is performed with Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
hijacking. A side-channel analysis based MITM attack detection method is also investigated. A
game theory analysis is performed to give a broader view of this problem.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
The “smart grid” is a modern power system that uses information and communication tech-
nologies to provide more efficient, reliable, and sustainable energy than traditional power grid [110].
Different from the conventional power grid, a smart grid allows for a bidirectional flow of informa-
tion and energy, and the penetration of renewable energy sources, smart parking lots and prosumers
makes the smart grid more flexible but also challenging to control [19]. Real-time monitoring and
feed back from network connected sensors and devices are crucial to smart grid operations. As the
network connection has become a part of the control loop of the smart grid, the smart grid is facing
a whole new challenge in the area of network security.
Smart grid technologies such as synchrophasor networks consisting of Phasor Measurement
Units (PMUs) make it possible to monitor, analyzes, and control the electric power grid in real-
time. PMUs are one of the most important network connected devices used in smart grid. The
PMU measure frequencies, currents, voltages, and phase angles. Thses measurements are labeled
with GPS time tags and transmitted to the Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC) at system control
centers through synchrophasor networks for further analysis and control. Synchrophasor technology
enables reliable and efficient power system operation but also make the system susceptible to network
issues, such as connection instability and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Power system instability
could result from modified, delayed or dropped measurement packets from PMUs in closed-loop
application.
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The subject of this study involves the security of smart grid synchrophasor networks (PMUs,
PDCs, computers and communication systems), commonly known by the power systems society as
the cyber-security of smart grids [77] [2] instead of the power systems security.
One common prejudice in smart grid study is that encryption is the solution to most network
security issues, and data manipulation or data replay attacks are the most threating network attacks
faced by smart grid operations. It is indeed necessary to deploy encrypted communication channels
such as using the security gateways to establish Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels between
locations, which also eliminates many cyber vulnerabilities, including data manipulation or data
replay attacks. However, the deployment of encrypted communication is far from the complete
solution.
1.2 Cyber Physical Systems Security of Smart Grid
In this section, the current security vulnerabilities found in literature, that are relevant to
PMUs, are discussed and mapped to four general attack classes. Known network security vulnera-
bilities are also addressed in hopes of exposing gaps where further research needs to be conducted on
their specific effects on PMU networks. These attacks and countermeasures are surveyed to provide
future research possibilities.
Electricity is essential to maintaining the standard of living globally. Citizens need a reli-
able power grid. Increasing consumption requires either that more energy be produced or energy
generation be increasingly efficient. The “smart grid” is a modern power system that uses informa-
tion and communication technologies to provide efficient, reliable, and sustainable energy [110]. A
smart grid allows for bidirectional flow of information and energy in transmission and distribution
systems [19]. Real-time monitoring provides situational awareness of system conditions, and ensures
that power is continuously available to consumers. Although real-time feedback is critical to power
system operations, communications are susceptible to cyber-attacks.
Synchrophasor technology using Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) provide feedback of
the current state of the power system in real time. Synchrophasor measurements are sent to a
substation/control center and stored in a database. PMUs communicate to the substation/control
center using TCP/IP network connections. The use of TCP/IP makes the system vulnerable to
known cyber-attacks. Stallings [101] divides attacks into four general classes: interruption, inter-
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Figure 1.1: An Example Synchrophasor Network.
Table 1.1: Documented Security Vulnerabilities
Current PMU Attacks General Class of Attack References to Attack
Denial of Service Interruption [19–21,61,63,78,100,103,120,124]
Physical Attack Interruption [11,19,21,63]
Man in the Middle Interception/Fabrication [19,21,31,63,78,80,120]
Packet Analysis Interception [21,78,80,103]
Malicious Code Injection Modification [19,21,31,45,72,78,100,120,123]
Data Spoofing Fabrication [11,19,21,78,96,103,120]
ception, modification, and fabrication. In this study, the current PMU security vulnerabilities are
surveyed and mapped into four attack classes. Known network vulnerabilities are also presented
under the four attack classes. Previous research, shown in Table 1.1, has investigated PMU vulner-
ability to Denial of Service (DoS), malicious code injection, packet analysis, physical damage, and
data spoofing attacks.
Fig. 1.1 shows an example Synchrophasor network. Global Positioning System (GPS) time
stamps allow measurements to be synchronized so the network can be analyzed as a whole [20].
Once the synchrophasors synchronized with the GPS, each measurement the synchrophasor sends
across the network includes a time stamp. All electrical distribution line measurements are sent via
a network connection to a PDC. The PDC is a regional command station for the grid [63]. The
PDC stores measurements for additional processing.
1.2.1 Interruption Attacks
The simplest interruption attack is a physical attack, for example, cutting a cable. A more
sophisticated attack is denial of service. DoS attackers attempt to consume systems resources, such
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as bandwidth, to prevent users from accessing the system. DoS attacks can use flaws in network
protocols to deny access to legitimate users. One common type of DoS attack is an Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP) attack [124]. In a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, the
attacker takes control of multiple machines that are called zombies. Zombies are used to overload
the target’s bandwidth, resulting in legitimate traffic being slowed or dropped.
1.2.1.1 PMU Specific DoS
Researchers in [78] tested various types of DOS attacks such as network layer attacks,
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) attacks, transport layer attacks, Local Area Network
Denial (LAND) attacks, and teardrop attacks against the PMU network. All of these attacks
take advantage of weaknesses in network protocols. The PMU network is dependent on real-time
measurement data, making it vulnerable to this attack. If a malicious person were to perform this
attack on multiple PMUs, all of the measurements from those PMUs would either be dropped or
delayed. This could cause inaccurate predictions about the status of the transmission system, delayed
mitigation of power system problems, or total failure of measurement devices along the network.
1.2.1.2 DoS Countermeasures
Even though DOS attacks remain a serious threat to power grids that incorporate PMU
networks, there are limited ways to prevent or mitigate the damage caused by an attacker. One
possible solution to DOS attacks on PMU networks would be to use an “air gap” network. Air gap
networks provide no physical connection to the larger Internet. This type of isolation comes with
the disadvantage of cost, it is costly to build separate network infrastructure for the power grid.
Some of the common DOS countermeasures are the use of big pipes or large bandwidth connections
to insure the network can handle the traffic. DOS traffic can also be mitigated using distributed or
redundant infrastructure. Researchers in [61] discuss DDOS attacks and there countermeasures. The
paper discusses the different types of flooding attacks, the methods to detect flooding attacks, and
existing countermeasures. [47] proposed a mechanism to resist Denial-of-Service attacks efficiently.
[62] proposed an authentication scheme can prevent DOS attacks even if attackers break servers.
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1.2.1.3 Physical Attacks
A PMU can be isolated from the network by using physical attacks that damage hardware or
infrastructure. This includes cutting a network connection between the PMU and PDC or sabotaging
the PMU. Limiting access to critical infrastructure can mitigate this type of attack. Not included
are software attacks that effect hardware.
1.2.2 Interception
Two types of interception attacks that effect synchrophasor networks are (passive) packet
analysis and (active) man-in-the-middle attacks. The basis of an interception attack is to use the
information communicated via the PMU and PDC to the attacker’s advantage unlike an interruption
attacks that stops communications.
1.2.2.1 Packet Analysis
Contents of the PMU TCP/IP packets are susceptible to packet analysis, “sniffing”. Pro-
gram such as Wireshark [19], allow attackers to look at the traffic being sent across the network.
If encryption is not used, all information communicated can be seen by the attacker. In [103], re-
searchers used Wireshark to analyze the synchrophasor network. The network traffic was redirected
and captured, and the data was in clear text. This makes it possible for an attacker to get passwords
and other information sent across the network.
1.2.2.2 Packet Analysis Countermeasures
Adding a security gateway to the network, allows the packets to be sent across a virtual
private network (VPN) tunnel. Researchers in [103] found that when packets were sent through
a virtual private network (VPN) tunnel, the traffic was encrypted. VPN’s allow users to create
a virtual network between two sub-networks that are trusted. The packets sent within the VPN
are in a secure tunnel between the clients. VPN tunnels commonly use the Secure Socket Layer
(SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to secure the communications between VPNs. To
insure a secure connection the parties on the network use X.509 certificates to authenticate users
and then exchange symmetric keys. This process is supposed to provide the system with security,
but may have implementation and design errors. Some of the previously successful attacks on
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SSL/TLS include [21]: DNS Cache Poisoning, ARP Poisoning, Man-in-the-Middle Attacks and
TLS/SSL Certificate Attacks. VPNs are essential for securing traffic, but they need to be carefully
implemented and their security verified. Each of these attacks have been shown to work on networks,
research still needs to be conducted to see their impacts on PMU networks. They are not a panacea;
rather they are part of a reasonable security program.
1.2.2.3 Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
Man-in-the-Middle (MIM) attacks occur when an attacker poses as the other side of a legiti-
mate protocol session to both the legitimate client and server. For example, if B and A communicate,
the intruder I replaces the BA link with two links BI and IA. In a PMU network, a Man-in-the-
Middle attack would occur between the PMU and the PDC. The attackers disguise themselves as the
PDC to the PMU and as the PMU to the PDC. Man-in-the-Middle attacks can use methods such
as route table poisoning, modified packet source and destinations, and using compromised certifi-
cates. Researchers in [24] discuss a method of using false certificates to conduct a Man-in-the-Middle
attack. The paper discusses the false certificate vulnerability for a HTTPS connection. However,
this method could be further utilized in any system that uses certificates to secure connections. In
the PMU network, if the PDC uses X.509 certificates for authentication then a Man-in-the-Middle
attack would be possible between the PDC and the PMU.
1.2.2.4 Man-in-the-Middle Attacks Countermeasures
To prevent this type of attack from occurring, the users need to authenticate the server they
try to connect to [80]. One of the most common authenticate applications applied today is to employ
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to authenticate the server.
SSL/TLS provides support for user authentication based on public key certificates. Use public
key certificates system to defeating man-in-the- middle attacks is theoretically a solved problem.
However, in many cases [32], secrets are sent directly from clients to servers with almost every
request across all layers of the network stack make this technique vulnerable. In [32], researchers
developed a layered solution to solve the problem, each layer consisting of minor adjustments to
existing mechanisms across the network stack. [62] proposed an authentication scheme can prevent
MIM attacks even if attackers break servers.
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1.2.2.5 Side Channel Attack
Protocol tunneling is widely used to add security and/or privacy to Internet applications.
Recent research has exposed side channel vulnerabilities that leak information about tunneled pro-
tocols [46]. Side-channels extract information by indirectly observing implementation artifacts. For
example, a significant timing side-channel vulnerability for SSH can extract the system password
from interactive sessions [98].
1.2.2.6 Side Channel Attack Countermeasures
These attacks can best be countered by saturating the communications channels leaving
no available bandwidth for patterns to emerge. Due to the extreme resource requirements, this
approach can only be used in extreme cases [46].
1.2.3 Modification
Modification attacks look for security vulnerabilities to corrupt, highjack, or alter a legit-
imate process. An example of this type of attack is malicious code injection. In a malicious code
injection attack, the attacker inserts new instructions into a piece of code to alter its form of ex-
ecution. One common type of modification attack is Structured Query Language (SQL) injection.
SQL is a standardized language for managing databases. This form of attack allows the attacker to
insert a script into a piece of code to alter the database.
1.2.3.1 PMU Specific Malicious Code Injection
PMUs continuously send measurements to the PDC. Before measurements are sent across
the network, the PMU sends a configuration message to the PDC to specifying the data table to
set up in its database [103]. The PDC does not authenticate the configuration message. Instead,
it creates new tables specified in the configuration message. This leaves the system vulnerable
to code injection. Researchers in [123] describe two insertion attacks: code-injection and return-
oriented programming. In code-injection, the attacker directly inserts shell code (a set of malicious
instructions) into the program. Return-oriented programming reuses binary code already present
in the system as shell code. Shell code is the software exploit payload. Either attack can send
malicious instructions to the database management system, to add, delete, or modify the database,
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or take control of the system. Since all the data sent to the PDC is stored in a database, PMUs
are particularly susceptible to SQL injection attacks [31]. The SQL injection vulnerability most
frequently comes when queries are formulated from user inputs. This attack occurs if user input
is not properly validated before inclusion in the SQL query [45].This attack can add, delete, or
modify the database contents and therefore directly modify, corrupt, append, and/or disable PMU
measurement information. The attacker can make the condition of a transmission system appear to
be the opposite of its actual state. For example, if there is an issue with a transmission bus or line,
an attacker can modify measurements to indicate it is normal, which could put the power system at
risk for an outage.
1.2.3.2 Countermeasures
In [123] the authors suggest detecting code insertion by monitoring program performance.
If an attacker has inserted shell code into a program, the program should behave unusually. Another
method to overcome malicious code injection attacks on PMU networks is to use randomized en-
cryption keys when transferring messages [50]. Only the PMU and the PDC would have the key. If
the attacker does- not have the random key, then they will be unable to decipher the instructions. In
modern operating systems, code injection is made difficult by either randomizing the system address
space or monitoring the stack to detect buffer overflows [21]. Both of these approaches could be rel-
evant to PMU network implementation. [118] proposed a geographical routing protocol allows peers
in a Smart Grid system to adjust their interaction behaviors based on the trustworthiness of others.
The protocol can avoid packet drop attack and data spoofing attack by using a safe forwarding
list. [62] proposed an authentication scheme can prevent attackers to resent previously intercepted
login messages even if attackers break servers. To counteract SQL injection attacks: either check
inputs for characters that can be abused, or use parameterized statements that force user inputs to
follow a static template. These templates only allow certain inputs to be translated into queries.
For further prevention, databases should also have strict access controls for allowing users to modify
or manipulate data.
1.2.4 Fabrication
Fabrication attacks occur when attackers create a fictitious asset on the network. Data
spoofing and the previously mentioned Man-in-the-Middle attack both are fabrication attacks. Both
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send fabricated data across the network. The PMUs continuously send data to the PDC along with
instructions on how to set up database tables. Man-in-the-Middle and data spoofing attacks can
send false measurements. This differs somewhat from modification attacks, since the data can be not
related to current measurement data. If the PDC collecting the data does not authenticate PMUs
on the network, the PDC may accept fabricated data.
1.2.4.1 PMU Data Spoofing
Since the control centers will depend on the feedback from the PMUs to make decisions
about the current condition of the electrical grid, the accuracy of the data is important. Data
spoofing gives the control center forged data instead of actual data. This can be detrimental to the
stability and reliability of the grid. In [100], researchers inject false data into the system. This data
can be either PMU measurements or measurement time stamps. In [96], authors spoof the GPS
time stamps for measurements. Altering measurement times can render measurements useless. For
example, readings can be reordered to make capacity reduction seem to be capacity increase, etc.
1.2.4.2 Data Spoofing Countermeasures
In [120], authors show that data spoofing has very little effect when it is limited to a single
data feed. To mitigate data spoofing the grid can use multiple PMUs to monitor the same electrical
transmission bus or line, which would make spoofing more complicated. The use of redundant
measuring devices is supported by [11]. Those authors use redundant smart meters, but the same
idea is relevant to PMUs. In [41], authors proposed a multi-antenna based algorithm to detect time
stamp spoof. The GPS signals from two receiving antennas are fed to two independent processing
units. The differences of the carrier-signal-to-noise ratio (ClNo) from these two receiving paths
can be exploited as probabilistic measures. Using this, the change in the distribution of sequential
samples is detectable. [118] proposed a geographical routing protocol, which can avoid packet drop
attack and data spoofing attack by using a safe forwarding list.
1.2.5 Access Control
With insufficiencies of the legacy power grid communications protocols, increased data gen-
eration and communications bring about new challenges in access and collecting the data. Some
recent researches presented access control methods for Electric Power Synchrophasor Networks,
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which could provide both security and efficiency [121], [119], [12], [27]. In [108], researchers pre-
sented a data collector protocol, which can verify the integrity while they are not given access to
the content. [62] proposed an authentication scheme can prevent Off-line dictionary attacks.
1.2.6 Countermeasures After Attacks Occurred
Some other researches are focused on attack detections and countermeasures after attacks
occurred. [48] proposed game payoff formulae. A decision analysis can then be obtained by applying
backward induction technique on the game tree. [64] provided a dynamical systems context for
formulating distributed multi-switch strategies. [10] presented intrusion detection methods used to
analyze the measurement data to detect any possible cyber-attacks on the operation of smart grid
systems. [39] analyzed the cyber-attack related time delay issues, and deals with the minimization
of negative effects of such delays in smart gird system.
1.2.7 Summary of This Section
The “smart grid” is a modern power grid that uses information and communication tech-
nology to provide reliable, efficient, and sustainable power. To upgrade the current power system
to a smart grid, PMUs are being installed. Due to limited amount of research on how these attacks
effect PMU networks, further research needs to be conducted to determine their effects.
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1.3 Objectives
The objectives of this dissertation are list as follows:
• Investigate side-channel vulnerabilities in encrypted synchrophasor network communication
and its consequences.
• Investigate and evaluate mitigation methods against the above vulnerabilities.
• Perform game theory analysis to the synchrophasor network security.
1.4 Contributions to Date
The contributions of this dissertation are list as follows:
• Comprehensive reviews of synchrophasor network security.
• Packet size side-channel and inter-packet timing side-channel are discovered in encrypted syn-
chrophasor network communication.
• Protocol transformation from botnet traffic to synchrophasor protocol is implemented.
• DoS attack that exploits side-channel vulnerabilities on tie-line bias control using Automatic
Generation Controller are investigated and consequences outlined.
• Countermeasures against above DoS attacks using Cellular Computational Network [112] based
Virtual Synchrophasor Network are developed and shown to be most effective.
• Real-time DoS attacks and Virtual Synchrophasor Network countermeasures are performed.
• The resiliency test of Virtual Synchrophasor Network by mitigating multiple DoS attacks is
performed.
• Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) hijacking attack detection on PMU data stream are proposed
and evaluated.
• Game Theory Analysis is performed to find the best strategy under different circumstances.
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1.5 Organization of this Dissertation
This dissertation begins with introducing necessary background knowledge in Chapter 2.Then,
Chapter 3 focuses on the side-channel vulnerabilities of PMU; Chapter 4 explores the feasibility of
protocol transformation. DoS attacks based on this vulnerability is presented in Chapter 5. A
mitigation method of above DoS attack is proposed in Chapter 6. The resiliency of the mitigation
method is studied in Chapter 7. The best strategy under different circumstances are identified in
Chapter 9 Finally, a conclusion is given in Chapter 10.
1.6 Publications
1. A. Keenan, R. Schweller, and X. Zhong. Exponential replication of patterns in the signal tile
assembly model. In D. Soloveichik and B. Yurke, editors, DNA Computing and Molecular
Programming, pages 118–132, Cham, 2013. Springer International Publishing
2. J. E. Padilla, M. J. Patitz, R. Pena, R. T. Schweller, N. C. Seeman, R. Sheline, S. M. Summers,
and X. Zhong. Asynchronous signal passing for tile self-assembly: Fuel efficient computation
and efficient assembly of shapes. In G. Mauri, A. Dennunzio, L. Manzoni, and A. E. Por-
reca, editors, Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation, pages 174–185, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2013. Springer Berlin Heidelberg
3. C. Beasley, X. Zhong, J. Deng, R. Brooks, and G. Kumar Venayagamoorthy. A Survey of
Electric Power Synchrophasor Network Cyber Security. In Innovative Smart Grid Technologies
Conference Europe (ISGT-Europe), 2014 IEEE PES, pages 1–5, Oct 2014
4. X. Zhong, A. Ahmadi, R. Brooks, G. K. Venayagamoorthy, L. Yu, and Y. Fu. Side channel
analysis of multiple pmu data in electric power systems. In 2015 Clemson University Power
Systems Conference (PSC), pages 1–6, March 2015
5. X. Zhong, P. Arunagirinathan, A. Ahmadi, R. R. Brooks, and G. K. Venayagamoorthy. Side-
channels in electric power synchrophasor network data traffic. In Proceedings of the 10th
Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference, CISR ’15, pages 3:1–3:8, Oak
Ridge, Tennessee, USA, 2015. ACM
12
6. X. Zhong, L. Yu, R. Brooks, and G. K. Venayagamoorthy. Cyber security in smart dc microgrid
operations. In 2015 IEEE First International Conference on DC Microgrids (ICDCM), pages
86–91, June 2015
7. X. Zhong, Y. Fu, L. Yu, R. Brooks, and G. K. Venayagamoorthy. Stealthy malware traffic -
not as innocent as it looks. In 2015 10th International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted
Software (MALWARE), pages 110–116, Oct 2015
8. A. Keenan, R. Schweller, M. Sherman, and X. Zhong. Fast arithmetic in algorithmic self-
assembly. Natural Computing, 15(1):115–128, Mar 2016
9. Y. Fu, Z. Jia, L. Yu, X. Zhong, and R. Brooks. A covert data transport protocol. In 2016 11th
International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software (MALWARE), pages 1–8, Oct
2016
10. X. Zhong, I. Jayawardene, G. K. Venayagamoorthy, and R. Brooks. Denial of service attack on
tie-line bias control in a power system with pv plant. IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics
in Computational Intelligence, 1(5):375–390, Oct 2017
11. R. R. Brooks, L. Yu, Y. Fu, G. Cordone, J. Oakley, and X. Zhong. Using markov models and
statistics to learn, extract, fuse, and detect patterns in raw data. In N. S. Rao, R. R. Brooks,
and C. Q. Wu, editors, Proceedings of International Symposium on Sensor Networks, Systems
and Security, pages 265–283, Cham, 2018. Springer International Publishing
12. X. Zhong, P. Arunagirinathan, I. Jayawardene, G. K. Venayagamoorthy, and R. Brooks. Pha-
sortoolbox – a python package for synchrophasor application prototyping. In 2018 Clemson
University Power Systems Conference (PSC), 2018
13. X. Zhong, P. Arunagirinathan, I. Jayawardene, G. K. Venayagamoorthy, and R. Brooks. A
virtual synchrophasor network for power system resiliency under concurrent dos attacks. IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems. Submitted for peer review
14. X. Zhong, G. K. Venayagamoorthy, and R. Brooks. Bgp hijacking detection in synchrophasor
network. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems Letter. Submitted for peer review
13
1.7 Summary
The original intention in deploying synchrophasor devices is for reducing the system op-
eration cost while increasing both revenue and service quality. However, the cost of a guaranteed
delivery of real-time PMU measurement data is expensive.
Traditional power grid controls do not address the new challenges in the smart grid, and
existing network security solutions do not fulfill smart grid operation requirements. Little research
has been carried out at this intersection to identify the potential problems, evaluate their impact on
synchrophasor networks and addressing those vulnerabilities.
This dissertation gives a brief overview of the area and then profoundly dig into one specific
problem. Network security vulnerabilities that are unique to smart grid operations are identified.
Such vulnerabilities are critical to the smart grid operation but easily overlooked without enough
understanding of both areas. The consequence of the vulnerabilities is presented. The solution
specifically for this problem is explored and evaluated. Finally, the perspective of this discussion is
expanded with game theory analysis to give a broader view of the network security research in the
smart grid.
The study and results presented in this dissertation reduced the gap in the field, effectively
reduces both the cost and risk of adopting PMU in closed-loop applications and further enhancing
the reliability of the smart grid.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Overview
In this chapter, the terminology and necessary background for this dissertation are pre-
sented.
2.2 The Synchrophasor Protocol
Since PMUs are widely distributed and used by many electric power utilities, a standard
protocol ensures consistent data storage and network communications between PMU networks. The
current PMU communications standard is the IEEE C37.118 protocol [52], which defines synchropha-
sor data conventions, measurement accuracies, and communications formats . To adhere to the
IEEE C37.118 protocol, the synchrophasor has to recognize five frame types: Data frame (binary),
Two configuration frames (binary), Header frame (ASCII) and Command frame (binary). The
configuration and header frames describe the synchrophasor configuration, the data frame contains
measurements, and the command frame tells the PMU when to start and stop taking measurements.
Once measurements have been collected, they are processed using a phasor data concentrator (PDC)
such as the open-source OpenPDC [7]. OpenPDC takes measurements and sorts them by their time
stamps. The measurements are archived in a database using their time stamps.
The structure of the protocol is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The mapping of the protocol in a
IP packet is shown in Figure 2.2 A typical sequence diagram of communications between OpenPDC
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and one PMU in the application layer is shown in Figure 2.3. OpenPDC starts a new session
by sending a command asking the PMU to stop current data transmission, followed by a request
for a configuration frame, which describes the format of PMU measurement packets used for this
transmission. After receiving the configuration frame from PMU, OpenPDC sends the PMU a start
command. Once the measurement data transmission starts, it will not stop until a stop command
is received or the connection is lost. OpenPDC acknowledges each measurement data packet it
receives.
Figure 2.1: Example of frame transmission order. This figure is from IEEE Standard C37.118.2 [52]
Figure 2.2: Mapping of IEEE C37.118 data into a TCP or UDP packet A transport layer header
and trailer are shown, as it would be when using Ethernet. This figure is from IEEE Standard
C37.118.2 [52]
2.3 Security Gateways
Security gateways establish VPN tunnels between private networks through public network.
The security gateways encrypt and decrypt packets. The deployment of security gateways reduces
the risk of sending critical data through an unsecured network. In the power system, security
gateways are used in critical connections, such as, communications between PMUs and PDCs. Each
packet sent from a PMU or PDC contains a TCP/IP header and payload, which will be encrypted by
security gateways. In order to send encrypted data through the conventional network, encrypted data
will be attached to a new IP and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) header as the encrypted
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Figure 2.3: Observed sequence diagram of Synchrophasor protocol in application layer
payload. After encryption, any data in the original packet like packet destination, source, and
original payload are encrypted. The source and destination IP address of the encrypted packets are
usually the IPs of two security gateways.
Security gateways use the Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) protocol to ensure communica-
tions and interoperation. As a framework protocol to secure the connection, IPsec mainly provides
authentication, verification and confidentiality. Authentication means checking if the data is from
where it claims to be. Verification means checking whether it has been altered. Confidentiality
means checking if the data is visible to third parties in transit [58]. IPsec protocols mainly provide
authentication, verification and confidentiality. Authentication ensures the data is from where it
claims to be, verification checks whether the received data has been altered, and confidentiality
ensures the data been transferred is not visible to third parties [58]. Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) and Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA or 3DES) are commonly used for encryption.
The authentication and encryption methods make it practically impossible to decrypt and modify
an encrypted packet without proper keys. Fig. 2.4 demonstrates the process that encrypts a PMU
measurement package by a security gateway.
The encryption algorithms used in IPsec have five modes, which are: ECB (Electronic Code
Book), CBC (Cipher Block Chaining), CFB (Cipher FeedBack), OFB (Output FeedBack), and
CTR (Counter) [49]. At the beginning of an encrypted connection session, two security gateways
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Figure 2.4: The PMU measurement packet encryption.
will negotiate the algorithm used for this session. In the experiments, it is found that CBC is used
in most cases. IPsec-secured links are defined in terms of Security Associations (SAs). Each SA is
defined for a single unidirectional flow of data, and usually from one single point to another. And
it produces traffic distinguishable by some unique selectors [58], which means the disruption of one
connection in one pair of nodes should not affect other connections within the same secure tunnel.
The security gateway quickly encrypts each packet and barely alters the timing features of
the original traffic. Similarly, the packet size of encrypted packets is correlated to the size of the
original packets. By analyzing the packet streams rather than looking at a specific packet, additional
information can be inferred.
2.4 Side-Channel Analysis
Although the encryption systems are mathematically difficult to crack, but the physical
implementation of cryptographic systems leak information. Side-channel analysis extract informa-
tion by observing implementation artifacts. For example, the power consumption of a computer is
correlated to different operations. By monitoring power consumption, the activities of a program
can be inferred [59]. For network enabled programs, it is possible to infer program operations by
analyzing the network traffic. In [98], a timing side-channel vulnerability of SSH has been used to
extract the system password from interactive sessions.
A VPN is a tunneled, and encrypted connection established between two private networks
though public network. Packets transferred through a VPN tunnel have the same source and desti-
nation IP. The real source and destination IPs for each packet are encrypted and can not be seen by
the third party. Fig. 2.5a shows a VPN tunnel that connects two private networks, multiple traffic
streams are transmitted though the tunnel including two PMU measurement data streams.
In [127], PMU measurement sessions are detected even when all packets are encrypted in
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.5: An example of a DoS attack in a VPN tunnel: (a) A VPN network carries Ping traffic
and data streams from two PMUs to control center; (b) During a DoS attack, a PMU data stream
within the VPN tunnel is identified and dropped.
a VPN tunnel. Furthermore, packet size side-channels and inter-packet timing side-channels can
differentiate between the sources of PMU packets when multiple PMU data streams are transmitted
in a single encrypted VPN tunnel. In this case, an encrypted VPN tunnel is established between
two subnets. Multiple PMUs in one subnet are connected to a PDC on the other subnet through
this encrypted VPN tunnel. Mapping the encrypted packets to PMUs based on inspect the content
of each packet is impossible. However, by using side-channel analysis, the most probable mapping
between packets and PMUs can be identified and a specific PMU data stream can be blocked by an
attacker without interfering with other traffic in the same VPN tunnel, shown as Fig. 2.5b. This
attack is easy to perform but difficult to diagnose. The attack only identifies and blocks the PMU
data transmission stream. Other traffic from PMUs e.g. PING or HTTP is not blocked, thus making
the PMU appear to be connected to the network while not transmitting any data.
2.4.1 Hidden Markov Models
In previous work [13], detecting PMU measurement sessions was possible even when all
packets are encrypted by performing side channel analysis on timing delay between every two packets.
In that study, a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) using packet timing delays is built, where packets
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are captured from encrypted PMU traffic between two security gateways. Then HMM inference
is used to recognize encrypted PMU traffic. HMMs are widely used for pattern recognition and
detection [65].
2.5 Man-In-The-Middle Attack
A MITM attack is an cyber-attack that falls in to the category of interception attack [14].
Generally, it occurs anywhere between two legitimate nodes in a network. For example, if A and B
are two legitimate nodes connected by connection AB, attacker C can take over the connection by
replacing AB with connection AC and connection CB. So attacker C can intercept and modify all
communications between A and B. In PMU-PDC communications, attackers disguise themselves as
PMU if the packets are sent from PDC to PMU, and vice versa. It is the same for communications
between a PDC node and a super PDC. This vulnerability and countermeasures are discussed in [14].
Without using security gateways or any other security countermeasures, an attacker could view,
modify and redirect measurement packets easily. By using security gateways to encrypt the traffic,
the chance of packets being manipulated is practically eliminated.
The MITM attack is very easy to apply and can be performed in many different ways. On
the Internet, packets are redirected to the destination based on the Board Gateway Protocol (BGP)
routing mechanism. BGP route hijacking is very easy to be applied and sometimes caused by human
mistakes. In March 2015, traffic from Texas, US to the UK was redirected to Ukrainian and Russian
telecoms for five days. Multiple sites were affected, including UK’s official mail service, and nuclear
weapon managing and delivering system [113]. On April 26, 2017, Russian telecom Rostelecom
hijacked traffic belonging to MasterCard, Visa, and many other financial services companies for
several minutes [107]. In January 2017 Iran’s act of pornography censorship mistakenly redirected
traffic from Russia to Hong Kong to blank pages [114]. In a local network, MITM attack can
be performed in many ways such as Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing, Domain Name
System (DNS) poisoning, Media Access Control (MAC) address spoofing and so on.
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2.6 Summary
The terminology and background introduced in this chapter will be used in all following
chapters.
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Chapter 3
Side-Channel analysis of PMU
Traffic
3.1 Overview
Synchrophasor devices such as Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) are essential power sys-
tem components for real-time monitoring, analysis and control. The data from several PMUs are
sent to a Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC) via network connections. The PMU data are used for
monitoring electric power network operations and performing real-time decision-making and control.
In previous research [14], it has been pointed out that by using security gateways and Virtual Private
Network (VPN) tunnels to encrypt traffic, many possible vulnerabilities can be eliminated. How-
ever, these communications are still vulnerable to side-channel analysis. In previous studies [126],
side-channel inter-packet timing delays are used to map the packets to different PMUs.
In this study, packet size side-channel and inter-packet timing delay side-channels are used
to differentiate the source of PMU packets in an encrypted VPN tunnel containing multiple PMU
data streams. Two PMUs are connected to a PDC through an encrypted VPN tunnel. Packets
transferred in this VPN tunnel have unified source and destination IP addresses for each direction
and the original source IP is encrypted. Mapping packets in an encrypted VPN tunnel to PMUs
based on the clear text header in each packet is impossible. However, by using side-channel analysis,
the most probable mapping between packets and PMUs can be identified. The proposed methods
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can identify and block traffic from specific PMU in a power system.
3.2 PMU Packet Size Side-Channel
Analysis
In this section, the methods of identifying the packet source in an encrypted VPN tunnel
using packet size side-channel is explained, where the VPN tunnel is transporting packets from
multiple PMUs. The following subsections are organized as follows: Section 3.2.1 introduces the
experimental network configurations and give a brief overview of this method; Section 3.2.2 describes
the method to perform packet identification using packet size side-channel; Section 3.2.3 describes
methods used to evaluate the accuracy of these method.
To be consistent, ‘PMU 0’ and ‘PMU 1’ refer to two PMUs with different model numbers.
‘PMU A’ and ‘PMU B’ refer to two PMUs, the first packet in the main stream is assigned to
‘PMU A’, the identity of ‘PMU A’ is unknown; it is simply a label to distinguish between ‘PMU A’
and ‘PMU B’.
To identify PMU models using packet size side channels, it is needed to build a map between
encrypted or unencrypted packet size and its corresponding model number. In this experiment, there
are only two PMUs sending packets through one VPN tunnel and no other applications are sending
packets. To differentiate PMU models, no map is needed.
3.2.1 Experimental Setup and Procedure
All experiments and measurements are carried out in the Real-Time Power and Intelligent
Systems (RTPIS) Laboratory in Clemson University [92]. At the RTPIS lab, simulating power
systems in real-time and collecting data using PMUs is possible. Real Time Digital Simulator
(RTDS) is used to build and perform real-time simulation of a power system. The hardware PMUs
are used to take measurements. There are hardware and software PDCs, and both of them can
collect data from PMUs. In this study, software, OpenPDC, is used to collect data from hardware
PMUs. Also, two hardware security gateways are set up to encrypt and decrypt packets between
PMUs and PDCs. Wireshark running on computers connected to the hubs in the network is used
to collect packets. The network configurations are shown in Figs. 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
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Figure 3.1: Network configuration for packet size sampling of PMU 0.
The first two network configurations (Figs. 3.1 and 3.2) are used to get packet size and
inter-packet timing delay samples. The third network configuration (Fig. 3.3) is used to perform
packet identification and evaluate its accuracy. PMUs and PDCs do not encrypt or decrypt packets,
so the packets collected at ‘HUB 0’ and ‘HUB 2’ in three Figs. 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 are in clear-text and
the payload and IP source/destination of each packet are observable. Packets are encrypted between
security gateway SG 0 and security gateway SG 1 shown in Figs. 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. It is noticed that
variation in power grid dynamics has no affect on the packet sizes between different PMUs.
Data collected under the network setting shown in Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 is used to build the
map between packet sizes and PMU model numbers. The histograms of packet sizes can be found in
Appendix 3.4.1. After getting the mapping of packet sizes to PMU model numbers (Table 3.3), both
PMUs are added to the network, as shown in Fig. 3.3. Packet sizes to PMU model numbers map
is used to determine the source of each packet collected at the hub between two security gateways,
shown as ‘Hub 1’ in Fig. 3.3. Finally, the accuracy of the identification method is discussed.
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Figure 3.2: Network configuration for packet size sampling of PMU 1.
Figure 3.3: Network configuration for packet separation.
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3.2.2 Packet Size to PMU Model Map
The packets generated from different PMU models have different sizes. There are two types
of PMU packets essential to power grid operation: PMU measurement and PMU configuration pack-
ets. Each PMU measurement packet is composed by a fixed length header followed by synchrophasor
data frames. The size of each synchrophasor data frame is related to PMU models, where different
models have different synchrophasor data frame sizes. The size of a PMU measurement packet can
be expressed as Eqn. 3.1
SPMU = 54 + n× SDATA (3.1)
Where SPMU is the length of PMU measurement packet, 54 is the byte size of the header, n is the
integer number of data frames contained in this packet and SDATA is the length of synchrophasor
data frame for this PMU model. From the data captured, a map from synchrophasor data frame
size to PMU model numbers is shown as Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Map of Synchrophasor Data Frame Sizes to PMU Model Numbers
Synchrophasor Data Frame Size PMU Model Number
154 PMU 0
284 PMU 1
A PMU configuration packet is sent at the beginning of each PMU-PDC session. The map
of PMU configuration packet size to PMU model number is shown as Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Map of PMU configuration packet size to PMU Model Numbers
Encrypted PMU Configuration
Packet Size PMU Model Number
428 PMU 0
1008 PMU 1
Encrypted by security gateways, each encrypted packet is composed by a fixed length of
header and ESP payload. The encryption algorithm used by security gate ways requires the size of
data is an integer multiple of 32 bytes. Therefore, a variable size of “padding” is attached to extend
the payload data. The relation between clear-text packet size and cypher-text packet size can be
expressed as Eqn. 3.2
Scypher = 54 + bSclear
16
+ 1c × 16 (3.2)
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Where Scypher is the size of cypher-text packet, 54 is the byte size of header and Sclear is the size of
clear-text packet.
In most of the cases, each PMU packet contains one synchrophasor data frame. When
packets are lost, PMU will resend packets contains multiple synchrophasor data frames. The number
of synchrophasor data frames is usually between 1 to 10. Thus, a map between clear-text PMU packet
sizes, cypher-text packet sizes and PMU model numbers is inferred as Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Map of Packet Sizes to PMU Model Numbers
Packet type Number of Synchro Clear-text Cypher-text PMU Model Number
-phasor Data Frames Packet Size Packet Size
C 428 486 PMU 0
M 1 208 278 PMU 0
M 2 362 422 PMU 0
M 3 516 582 PMU 0
M 4 670 726 PMU 0
M 5 824 886 PMU 0
M 6 978 1046 PMU 0
M 7 1132 1190 PMU 0
M 8 1286 1350 PMU 0
M 9 1440 1510 PMU 0
M 10 1594 1654 PMU 0
C 1008 1078 PMU 1
M 1 338 406 PMU 1
M 2 622 678 PMU 1
M 3 906 966 PMU 1
M 4 1190 1254 PMU 1
M 5 1474 1542 PMU 1
M 6 1758 1814 PMU 1
M 7 2042 2102 PMU 1
M 8 2326 2390 PMU 1
M 9 2610 2678 PMU 1
M 10 2894 2950 PMU 1
‘M’ denotes for Measurement packet, ‘C’ denotes for Configuration packet
This allows the PMU model numbers to be inferred from encrypted traffic in near real-time.
3.2.3 Comparison Between Encrypted and Unencrypted Data Streams
In this study, different PMU models are used and no other hardware in the network produces
packets of the same size. Encrypted packets can be mapped to specific PMU models using the packet
size side-channel with 100% accuracy rate. If the network contains packets have the same sizes with
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PMU packets but are not from PMU, the accuracy rate should be lower.
3.3 Inter-Packet Timing Delay Side-Channel Analysis
In this section, the method of identifying packet source in an encrypted VPN tunnel using
inter-packet timing delay side-channel is explained, where the VPN tunnel is transporting packets
from multiple PMUs. The following subsections are organized as follows: Section 3.3.1 introduces
the network configurations and gives a brief overview of the method; Section 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 describe
the two steps of this method to perform packet separation and section 3.3.4 describes the method
used to evaluate the accuracy of the proposed packet separation method.
3.3.1 Experimental Setup and Procedure
The experiments in this section using similar settings to Section 3.2. First, data is collected
under the network setting shown in Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 to infer the HMM model for a single PMU, as
well as, obtain the peak timing delays.
After getting peak timing delays, shown as Fig. 3.5, and the HMM model for a single PMU,
shown as Fig. 3.6, both PMUs are added to the network, shown as Fig. 3.3. Algorithm 1 (Section
3.3.3) along with HMM and peak timing delays are used to determine the source of each packet
collected at the ‘Hub 1’ between two security gateways, shown in Fig. 3.3. Finally, the accuracy of
this method is checked by comparing the source of each encrypted packets inferred with the source
of each unencrypted packets captured simultaneously at the ‘Hub 0’ on PMU side, shown in Fig.
3.3.
3.3.2 HMM for Single PMU Recognition
The HMM construction algorithm can be found [65], which infers the HMM structure and
state transition probabilities from a sequence of symbolized observations. To infer the HMM struc-
ture, a sequence of symbols with length L is needed. An extension [95] is used to determine the
parameter L and derive HMMs with no a priori information. Starting from 1, by gradually increas-
ing L, the HMM for each value of L is constructed. A symbol-to-state mapping is built to check if
the model structure stabilizes. If the inferred HMM stabilizes, the model is declared correct [95].
This occurs when with no additional statistical relevant information could be gained with larger L.
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If the HMM is built from an insufficient amount of observation data, it will not statistically represent
the underlying process. A model confidence test is carried out to determine if the constructed model
matches the underlying process with a given level of statistical significance [122]. This approach
also calculates a lower bound on the number of samples needed for building a correct model. If the
number of input samples is less than the bound, more data is collected. New models inferred with
more data are still checked for the confidence. This approach allows us to remove the effect of noise
in the HMM inference [65]. The HMM inference approach is shown in Fig. 3.4.
Figure 3.4: HMM Inference Process.
The first experiment collects the inter-packet delays of same PMU sent through an encrypted
VPN tunnel under different scenarios. The histogram of inter-packet delays collected from a single
PMU traffic is shown in Fig. 3.5, in which there are three peaks along the x-axis. The leftmost peak
is omitted as it is considered insignificant compared with the other peaks during HMM inference. It
is noticed that variation in power grid dynamics doesn’t affect the selection of symbols and there is
no significant change in peak timing delays under different power grid dynamics. The HMM built
from the symbolized data sequence is given in Fig. 3.6.
3.3.3 Packet Separation Algorithm
This section considers the scenario of multiple PMUs sharing the same encrypted tunnel.
Assume that the HMM used by the target PMU and the peak timing delays are known, as well as
the number of PMUs. A packet separation algorithm is proposed to identify the packets generated
by multiple PMUs [126]. A sub stream is extracted recursively from a given number of packets
collected in the small time interval. The packets in the same sub stream should come from the same
PMU. In each recursion, all the possible combinations of the packet sources are considered. For
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Figure 3.5: A typical histogram of encrypted single PMU traffic captured in one hour. The horizontal
axis indicates timing delay, the vertical axis indicates the number of packets. Peak value of “a” is
0.024978s and peak value of “b” is 0.050002s. “c” is been trimmed during HMM inference.
Figure 3.6: HMM of one PMU in encrypted VPN tunnel.
each combination, packets for each source are used to build sub strings. For each sub strings, the
optimum mapping between the observed delays and the peak values is determined.
For delays generated by the target PMU, each of them should close to one of the peak values.
If a delay is not close to any peak value, that indicates that the packets do not belong to same PMU.
The square of the sum of the minimum squared value of deviations for each sub-stream in each
combination is compared and the sub-stream with the minimum value is selected. The packet in
the center of this interval has the highest credibility and the algorithm only takes this packet as the
result and ignores the results for other packets. The operation is repeated in a sliding window over
time to identify the packets sent by the target PMU.
In the simulation, the source of each packet are determined in near real-time and the average
time to process each packet is smaller than the timing delay of two PMUs. An Field Programmable
Gate Array (FPGA) could be used if the algorithm is used in a heavy traffic condition.
Inputs for the algorithm are: an array of packets’ arriving time A; Length of history to look
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Algorithm 1 Packet Separation Algorithm
1: for i = 1→ 2l do
2: bi = convert to base 2(i)
3: . (bi is a base 2 number)
4: ci = get and label l elements(l, A, bi)
5: for j = 1→ 2 do
6: cij = substream from source j(ci, j)
7: for k = 1→ number of items in cij do
8: dijk = timing delay between cijk and cijk−1
9: for m = 1→ number of items in P do
10: sijkm
= (dijk − Pm)
2
11: sijk = min(sijk , sijkm
)
12: end for
13: sij+ = (sijk )
2
14: end for
15: si = min(si, (sij )
2)
16: end for
17: retrieve ciy according to si
18: s min = min(s min, si)
19: end for
20: retrieve cxy according to smin
21: if cxy accepted by HMM then
22: return the label of the packet in the middle of cxy
23: else
24: retrieve cxy according to ssecond min
25: redo HMM check
26: end if
27: remove packets in cxy
28: redo Algorithm 1 for the rest packets
at l (for simplicity, l is an odd number); Sample peak values list P ; A HMM that can recognize
target traffic.
3.3.4 Comparison Between Encrypted and Unencrypted Data Streams
For side-channel using inter-packet timing delays, another method is used to check the
accuracy rate. Since there is no direct way to identify the source of each encrypted packet, the
approach only compares the combinations and permutations of obtained packets’ stream with the
unencrypted stream captured at ‘HUB 0’, as shown in Fig. 3.3. To be more specific, if the obtained
stream is 100% correct, and projections are only created between each pair of encrypted packet and
its corresponding unencrypted packet. Then the projection from the set of the sources of inferred
packets to the set sources of unencrypted packets is an injective function. To calculate the accuracy
rate, the 100% correct injective function is built as a sample. Then among all packets pairs, the
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number of packet pairs that match the sample injective function are divided by the number of all
packet pairs.
In practice, the so-called “Head” packets are found in both encrypted and unencrypted
streams. Head packets are defined as several continuous packets that have the same combination
in both encrypted and unencrypted streams. Head packets are assumed to be the packets that
are corresponding between encrypted and unencrypted streams. Due to the low complexity of PMU
traffic, it is relatively easy to find a wrong Head, which the combination are the same but the packets
are not actually corresponded, if less than 500 packets are examined. A wrong Head may result in
a 90% match rate in its following packets. In the experiment, it is found that the accuracy rate
of the method is around 99%, which a Head with length more than 500 is used. So, in this study,
1000 packets are examined to determine the Head in each stream. It is said that the Head is found
until all 1000 packets in both streams have the same combination; otherwise, it is said there is not a
match. After finding the Head, the packets that was mistakenly inferred are counted. Another point
needed to be clarified is that, after the program made a mistake, all the following packets inference
are swapped. That means if the program makes a mistake on packet n, and the following inferring
was based on the decision of packet n, even if the program returns correct inference after packet n,
the packet inferred as “PMU A” before packet n are inferred as “PMU B” after packet n. To check
if there is a “swap” mistake, the comparison program checks the number of continues mistakes. If
the number of continues mistakes reaches to 5, which is really rare, the program reduces the count
of mistake by 5 and adds one swap mistake.
3.4 Results
A Pseudo Random Binary Signal (PRBS) of small magnitude is added to the excitation
system of generators G15 and G16 of the IEEE 68 bus system [89]. Typically, 5-10% of the excitation
voltage is applied as a PRBS signal. The PRBS signals are injected to the system to excite all possible
dynamics of the power system. The results obtained in [126] using side-channel of inter-packet delays
with window sizes 11, 9 and 7 are shown in Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 respectively.
The advantage of packet size side-channel has an 100% accuracy rate and a low computa-
tion complexity. To determine PMU model numbers, it requires a priori map from encrypted or
unencrypted packet size to PMU models. To differentiate PMU models, no priori map is needed.
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Table 3.4: Accuracy Rate Using Inter-Packet Timing Delay Side-Channel with Window Size of 11
Experiment setting Correct Count Mismatch Count Swap Count Accuracy Rate
PRBS to Generator 15 98072 1195 733 98.072%
PRBS to Generator 16 98392 1392 216 98.392%
No PRBS 98486 1463 51 98.486%
No Data Measurement 98119 1551 330 98.119%
Table 3.5: Accuracy Rate Using Inter-Packet Timing Delay Side-Channel with Window Size of 9
Experiment setting Correct Count Mismatch Count Swap Count Accuracy Rate
PRBS to Generator 15 98972 504 524 98.972%
PRBS to Generator 16 99193 764 43 99.193%
No PRBS 98604 1351 45 98.604%
No Data Measurement 98989 561 450 98.989%
However, the method is limited to differentiating PMU models and it cannot differentiate different
PMU instances. For example this method can not differentiate packet sources under the following
three instances: 1, Packets sent by multiple PMUs of the same model. 2, Packets sent by other
sources that have the same size with packets sent from PMU. 3, Packets sent by PMUs that have
the same least common multiple packet size, e.g. the sizes of packets from PMU a are 100, 200 and
300 while the sizes of packets from PMU b are 50, 100, 150 and 200.
The packet size side channel differentiates between PMU models, but can not separate
different PMU data streams. The timing side channel can isolate specific PMU data streams, but
can not identify the PMU model. The computation complexity of using inter-packet timing delay
side-channel increases exponentially with respect to the length of history to look at, and more history
is needed when more PMUs are in the network.
3.4.1 Histograms of PMU Data Streams
In this section, histograms are created using packet size, where the packets are collected
between two security gateways under different power grid situations. Histograms with no PRBS
in power grid are shown. There is no visible difference except packet numbers could be slightly
different between histograms presented in this section and histograms created under other power
grid situations.
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Table 3.6: Accuracy Rate Using Inter-Packet Timing Delay Side-Channel with Window Size of 7
Experiment setting Correct Count Mismatch Count Swap Count Accuracy Rate
PRBS to Generator 15 98053 1090 857 98.053%
PRBS to Generator 16 99064 873 63 99.064%
No PRBS 99678 262 60 99.678%
No Data Measurement 99329 402 269 99.329%
Table 3.7: Accuracy Rate Using Packet Size Side-Channel
Experiment setting Accuracy Rate
PRBS to Generator 15 100%
PRBS to Generator 16 100%
No PRBS 100%
No Data Measurement 100%
3.5 Summary
In this study, two methods are presented to distinguish the packets generated by different
PMUs sent through an encrypted VPN tunnel using the packet size and inter-packet timing delay
side-channels. A comparison between these two methods is also presented.
The results show that the proposed approach using packet size side-channel is 100% ac-
curate under some certain preconditions. It is demonstrated that the methods can be applied to
perform real-time analysis on the traffic of two PMUs. The comparison shows that the method using
packet size side-channel require less computing power to perform real-time analysis with multiple
PMUs. But this method is limited to determine different PMU models rather than different PMU
instances. By using inter-packet timing delay side-channel, multiple PMUs of the same model can
be distinguished.
As discussed earlier, those side-channels can be exploited to redirect or drop a target network
communication instance and remains accessibility to the remote host device within a VPN tunnel.
It could be difficult to detect the attack since the network session is still available. A simple way
to eliminate this vulnerability is by using software or hardware to make the packets size and timing
delay uniform. Future research includes using both packet size side-channel and inter-packet timing
delay side-channel cooperatively, PMU dropping, side-channel analysis with more PMUs and PMU
side-channel analysis in a more complicated real-world implementation.
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Figure 3.7: Histogram of one hour of data, which contains packets from PMU 0 and PMU 1 with
no PRBS in power grid. The peak value at 278 presents packets from PMU 0. The peak value at
406 presents packets from PMU 1
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Figure 3.8: Histogram of one hour of data where packets are captured from PMU 0 with no PRBS
in power grid.
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Figure 3.9: Histogram of one hour of data where packets are captured from PMU 1 with no PRBS
in power grid.
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Chapter 4
Traffic Camouflage
4.1 Overview
Malware authors conceal Command and Control (C&C) traffic1 by masquerading as le-
gitimate web browsing activity (HTTP or encrypted HTTPS) [44] or Internet relay chat (IRC).
Twitter and DNS queries have also been used to hide C&C communication channels [94]. Detection
techniques based on reverse engineering, side-channel analysis, etc., have emerged [16, 66]. Reverse
engineering of malware develops network signatures for malicious traffic filtering [99]. Many bots
use cryptography or obfuscation to disrupt signature-based detection [9], which can be foiled by
blocking all unknown encrypted traffic [74]. However, this has two drawbacks: (1) discouraging the
use of cryptography makes traffic less secure and (2) any false positives disrupt legitimate traffic
producing denial of service. Other research uses traffic analysis for detection. Chen [65] presents
timing side-channel analysis for Zbot detection using hidden Markov model (HMM) and probabilis-
tic context-free grammar (PCFG). Passive DNS traffic analysis system for detecting and tracking
malicious flux networks of a botnet is proposed in [84].
In this chapter, a counter-countermeasure that obscures the features used by malware traffic
detection tools is presented. The idea is to camouflage malware traffic as an innocuous application
protocol using format-transforming encryption (FTE) [35] and side-channel massage (SCM). FTE
converts traffic flow to another application protocol using a regular expression describing the target
1In the context of cybersecurity, attackers use C&C infrastructure to issue C&C instructions to their victims
through network.
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protocol. This thwarts existing detection approaches because they detect that the infected machines
are using IRC, HTTP/HTTPS or DNS to communicate. Additionally, the FTE output is processed
using SCM to modify side-channel features, making the system resistant to side-channel analysis.
The motivation of this study is to reveal the weakness of existing traffic detection techniques and
show that more sophisticated malware traffic detection solutions are needed.
This counter-countermeasure is illustrated by camouflaging Zbot traffic. Zeus malware is
notorious for stealing on-line financial information. The source code of Zeus is on Github [97]. In
the experiment presented here, the Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) communication protocol is
the target protocol for the following reasons: (1) PMU traffic is in clear text [14,104], and resistant
to countermeasures that block encrypted traffic; (2) as early as 2009, the possibility of a power-grid
botnet consisting of buggy smart meters was raised [42]; and (3) the synchrophasor protocol used
for PMU communication is regular, simple and easy to imitate “in its entirety”. The feasibility
of converting botnet traffic to PMU traffic is explored in this study. Mimicking is done at the
application layer of the protocol stack, which simplifies the imitation process and reduces the risk of
errors. Experimental results show that the counterfeit PMU can talk with the real server without
being detected. Since the same traffic can be processed to recover the C&C traffic, the botnet
communications are effectively concealed.
4.2 Related Work
Malware uses traffic camouflaging to hide network traffic. Spyware Taidoor, a banking
trojan discovered in 2008, used a Yahoo blog as a botnet C&C server [18], the malicious traffic was
camouflaged as HTTP requests to blogs. According to Kaspersky Lab [102], ChewBacca and evolved
Zeus use the Tor network to hide communications. Pushdo malware [85] included domain names of
large companies or famous educational institutions in the C&C domain list, which made network
traffic analysis more difficult. The Morto Trojan [94] sent false DNS requests to a DNS server, which
was a C&C server, and the exchanged message was obfuscated by a simple Base64 encoding. The
proposed method can transform arbitrary traffic to a target protocol, so that malware detection
techniques looking for features of the original protocol won’t work.
Besides hiding malware traffic, traffic camouflage can also be used to evade surveillance and
censorship. The Onion Router (Tor) [90] provides an infrastructure for anonymous communication
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over a public network. The idea is to re-route network traffic through several browser-based short-
lived proxies (called relay nodes) to evade surveillance and censorship [36]. However, as Tor becomes
well-known, some unpublished relay nodes (bridges) are blocked in authoritarian countries [116].
To counter that, obfsproxy [86] is developed to circumvent censorship by camouflaging the
Tor traffic between client and bridge. It supports multiple protocols, called pluggable transports,
which specify how traffic is transformed. ScrambleSuit [117] is a polymorphic network protocol to
obfuscate the transported application data to defend against active probing and protocol fingerprint-
ing. SkypeMorph [75] is a Tor pluggable transport to reshape Tor packets to resemble Skype calls.
StegoTorus [115] first uses chopping to change packet sizes and timing information, and then uses
steganography to disguise Tor traffic as a message in an innocuous cover protocol, such as HTTP.
FTE [35] evades regular-based deep packet inspection (DPI) technologies by transforming Tor traffic
into a predefined format. Although FTE is effective in mimicking the contents of packets, it does not
mimic timing information, which is vulnerable to side-channel analysis. The proposed SCM method
‘massages’ the timing side-channel to ameliorate FTE.
4.3 Background
4.3.1 Malware Traffic Detection
Network-based malware detection techniques examine the behavior of underlying malicious
activities in the network traffic. Early study on network-based detection inspect the network packets
for known botnet signatures. DPI technologies are usually used [1]. However, signature-based detec-
tion suffers from computational complexity and can be easily foiled by encryption and obfuscation.
Other detection approaches include anomaly [15] detection, and traffic analysis [65, 84].
Although anomaly detection might detect unknown malware, it usually has high false positive rates
(FPRs). Traffic analysis exploits artifacts. Many properties of network traffic (packet size, power
consumption, timing, electromagnetic radiation, etc.) remain observable after encryption and reveal
valuable information. Attacks based on these properties are known as side-channel attacks. A timing
side-channel attack is presented in [30], which breaks the anonymity of Tor network by matching
packet timing data from any two Tor users to a model. The comparison gives a statistical likelihood
that the two systems are actually communicating over Tor. In [126, 127], it is demonstrated that
inter-packet delays and packet size can differentiate between packet streams coming from different
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PMUs.
Chen et al. [65] show Zbot traffic can be identified via timing side-channel analysis. The
timing pattern in network traffic is represented by a deterministic hidden Markov model (HMM),
which can be constructed from the collected inter-packet delays using the zero-knowledge HMM
inference algorithm [26, 95, 122]. Zbot traffic detection is performed by comparing the constructed
HMMs of the target traffic and Zbot traffic. This method is leveraged in this study to build the
HMM used for SCM.
4.3.2 Format-Transforming Encryption
A network protocol is a set of rules for communication. An implicit premise most of DPI
is that regular expressions are sufficient for identifying protocols [35]. Tools, such as Snort [99],
Bro [76] and L7-filter [37], use regular expressions to identify network protocols.
Format-Transforming Encryption (FTE) [35] is developed to evade regular expression based
protocol identification. It extends conventional symmetric encryption by formatting the ciphertext.
Arbitrary application-layer network traffic can be transformed into a target protocol using FTE. FTE
is used to evade Internet censorship and surveillance, because the original protocols are obfuscated.
Although FTE is effective in hiding network protocols, it can be a challenge to write the
regular expression for the target protocol. First, there is no automated software or procedures
to extract regular expressions from protocols. Second, a regular expression that fully describes a
protocol is usually complex. Although FTE can evade syntax-based protocol identification, it is
vulnerable to side-channel analysis. Features like packet size, inter-packet delays etc., can be used
for protocol identification. In this study, a SCM method is developed to obscure side-channel features
and augment FTE.
The implementation of FTE includes LibFTE and FTEproxy. LibFTE [34] is a python
library to transform string to ciphertext. FTEproxy [33] is a Tor [3] pluggable transport layer to
resist keyword filtering, censorship and discriminatory routing policies. LibFTE (version 0.1.0) [34]
is used in this study.
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4.3.3 Zeus Botnet
Botnets are groups of compromised computers that botmasters (botherders) use to launch
attacks over the Internet. As one of the most famous botnets, Zeus botnet is a malicious network
that steals banking information with keystroke logging and screen capture [65]. It can also be used in
other types of data or identity theft [71]. Since its first appearance in 2007, Zeus has been widespread
and infecting Windows machines through drive-by downloads and phishing schemes. Sold on the
black market, Zeus allows technically unsophisticated users to carry out cybercrimes. According
to [40] Trend Micro, Zeus (2.0.8.9) source code can cost $400-500 in the Russian market. In 2011,
the source code of Zeus was leaked on several underground forums over the Internet. A security
researcher compiled the code and confirmed it worked ‘like a charm’ [88].
Zbot (version 2.0.8.9) was retrieved from Github [97] for experimentation. It contains code
to build a Zeus Command and Control (C&C) server and generate executables to infect victim
machines. A Zeus C&C server is a PHP server with mySQL and Apache.
4.4 Traffic Camouflage
The counter-countermeasure consists of 2 steps: (1) Zbot traffic is transformed using FTE
to hide the source protocol; (2) the output of FTE is improved with SCM to modify inter- packet
delays to evade side-channel analysis.
4.4.1 FTE
The input of FTE includes the message to encrypt and the regular expression describing the
target protocol. The output ciphertext matches the input regular expression. There is a parameter,
called fixed slice, which refers to the number of bytes that FTE receiver-side should decrypt of
an incoming stream. For example, the target regular expression is ‘∧(a|b) + $’, which matches an
arbitrary long string only comprising a or b. Given a message helloworld and fixed slice = 512, a
string of aaaaaaaabababaab...bababbabaaababab containing 512 characters is obtained.
The goal is to transform Zbot traffic into a valid PMU data stream. PMU data is collected
to infer a regular expression for synchrophasor protocol. Table 4.1 shows the structure of a PMU
data packet [52], and the number of observed values for all fields. The extracted regular expression
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that fully describes observed PMU traffic is very complex. The transformation using this regular
expression requires excessive computational resources.
Table 4.1: PMU packet fields in application layer
Byte
Poisition
Length
in Bytes
Parameter
Name
Number of
observed
values
0 - 1 2
Synchroni-
zation word
1
2 - 3 2 Framesize 1
4 - 5 2
PMU/DC
ID number
1
6 - 9 4
SOC time
stamp (UTC)
3958
10 1
Time quality
flag
4
11 - 13 3
Fraction of
second (raw)
30
14 - 15 2 Flags 4
16 - 271
8
each
Phasor #1
- #32
118713
each
272 - 275 4
Actual
frequency
value
52
276 - 279 4
Rate of
change of
frequency
7573
280 - 281 2
Digital status
words
1
282 - 283 2 PMU checksum 54887
In this study, the FTE performance if improved by mapping observed PMU traffic directly
to a regular expression. The Zbot traffic is first transformed with FTE using an example regular
expression ‘∧[0 − 9a − f ] + $’. The output string consists of a sequence of hexadecimal symbols.
There are 16 possibilities for each character position. Each character position corresponds to one
PMU packet field. For each PMU packet field (Figure 4.1), the observed values of that field are
divided into 16 groups and assign each group a unique symbol. Based on the predefined mapping
relation from hexadecimal symbols to groups of value, for each character in the output string of
FTE, a value is randomly picked from the related group.
Note that the previous procedure only applies to fields with at least 16 possible values. For
fields with less than 16 possible values, a random value from the observation is used. For example,
suppose the FTE output is ‘a10b5d7...’. The first character ‘a’ corresponds to group number 10. So
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it can be replaced by a random value in the 10th group of the first field of PMU packet, which is
‘SOC time stamp (UTC)’.
There are several advantages of the proposed mapping technique: (1) The input regular
expression is straightforward. There is no need to extract regular expressions from target protocols.
(2) Since regular expression extraction is not needed, the process can be easily automated. (3) The
proposed mapping uses observed data, so the output is closer to real PMU traffic than traditional
FTE. (4) The throughput can be increased by adjusting the number of symbols used to represent
one protocol field.
4.4.2 Timing Side-Channel Massage (SCM)
Timing SCM modifies inter-packet delays to match the target protocol to evade side-channel
analysis. Given collected inter-packet delays of the target protocol, a deterministic HMM represent-
ing the timing pattern is constructed. A HMM is a statistical Markov model in which the modeled
system is a Markov process with unobserved (hidden) states. The standard HMM in [87] has two
sets of random processes: states and outputs (observations). In a deterministic HMM, there is only
a single set of random processes. In this model, the state transition labels are uniquely associated
with an output alphabet.
To infer the HMM representing the timing pattern of PMU traffic, packet collection is
performed on the PMU side. The time difference, 4t, is calculated by subtracting the receive time
of the previous packet from the time of the current packet. In other words, 4ti = ti − ti−1 where
ti is the receive time of packet i. Obviously, the first packet in the data sequence will not have
a value, so the process start with i = 2. This step is done so that network latencies between the
source and the destination are filtered out. Using the calculated values of 4t, the data is symbolized
by grouping it into ranges and assigning anything in that range a unique symbol such as a or b.
The symbolization result of is shown as Figure 4.1. Given the symbolized data sequence, the zero
knowledge HMM inference algorithm introduced in [26, 95, 122] is used to create the deterministic
HMM. The inferred model is shown in Figure 4.2.
Given the model, the counterfeit PMU starts the timing SCM process by randomly selecting
a start state in the model. To send the packet, a transition is taken from the current state and the
corresponding delay is waited before sending a packet to the PDC. If there are more than one possible
transitions out of current state, the transition is chosen randomly, weighed on the probability of each
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Figure 4.1: The symbolization of inter-packet timing delays of legitimate PMU traffic
Figure 4.2: The HMM of inter-packet timing delay side-channel of legitimate PMU traffic
transition.
4.5 Experiment
4.5.1 Traffic Collection
A Zeus C&C server and a Zeus bot are set up in the lab on two Windows XP virtual
machines. Figure 4.3 shows example botnet traffic. There are two protocols used: HTTP is for
communication with the C&C PHP server, and TCP for information exchange between bot and
botmaster. The volume of the collected bot traffic is 1.4MB.
In the Real-Time Power and Intelligent Systems (RTPIS) Laboratory of Clemson University
[92], a real-time power system is simulated with one hardware PMU and software openPDC (as
PDC). Network traffic between PMU and PDC are collected with Wireshark on the same machine
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Figure 4.3: Screenshot of botnet traffic (part)
(windows 7 OS) running openPDC software. The traffic collection lasts around one hour, and the
volume of collected traffic is 108.9MB.
4.5.2 Experiment Setup
The experiment setup is in Figure 4.4. The implementation includes a client-side program
(counterfeit PMU program) deployed on the bot and a decoder integrated as a front end of C&C
server. The client-side program takes the Zbot data stream as input, processes it with FTE then
SCM. It then sends the false PMU data over the network. When the data arrives at the server side,
it is decoded by the FTE decoder and forwarded the to C&C server.
Figure 4.4: Experiment setup.
4.5.3 Experiment, Results and Analysis
It is found that the bot and its C&C server communicate fluently with the deployment of the
traffic camouflage system. This indicates the false PMU data is decoded correctly before forwarded
to the C&C server.
As shown in Figure 4.5a, the false PMU packets are recognized as the synchrophasor proto-
col, i.e., the protocol used for PMU-PDC communication. The packet details of false PMU displayed
in Wireshark are shown in Figure 4.6a, which contain all the fields of a standard PMU packet as
shown in Table 4.1. Values of each field are legitimate because they are consistent with the real
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PMU packets. In particular, the voltage and current measurements are all within a reasonable range
compared with real PMU packet shown in Figure4.6b.
(a) Screen-shot of false PMU traffic (part)
(b) Screen-shot of real PMU to PDC traffic (part)
Figure 4.5: Comparison between false PMU traffic and real PMU to PDC traffic
To further evaluate the proposed approach, side-channel analysis in [66] is launched against
the false PMU data flow. The confidence interval (CI) approach in [22] is used to determine if the
observed false PMU traffic matches the PMU HMM (see Figure 3.6). The inter-packet delays of the
false PMU packets are computed and symbolized. Given the symbolized string, the CI method traces
the data back through the HMM. Meanwhile, transition probabilities and corresponding confidence
intervals are estimated by frequency counting. This process maps the observation data into the
HMM structure. After the confidence intervals are estimated, the percent of transition probabilities
from originally given HMM that fall into their respective confidence interval are determined. If this
percentage is greater than a threshold value, it is accepted that the observations adequately match
the HMM, i.e., the collected PMU traffic is legitimate in terms of timing.
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves are usually used to find the optimal threshold
value. By varying the threshold from 0% to 100%, the criteria for acceptance is progressively
increased. Since the HMM (see Figure 3.6) in this experiment only contains 2 states and each state
has one probability distribution, there are only 3 possible values for the percentage of probability
distributions that match, which are 0, 50%, 100%. So there is no need for a ROC curve. The
detection results using these three values are given in Table 4.2, where TPR denoted true positive
rate, FPR denotes the false positive rate, and l is the threshold used for detection. TPR means
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the percentage of real PMU traffic that is correctly identified by Wireshark, while FPR means the
percentage of false PMU traffic that is identified as PMU traffic. As shown in the results, it is
impossible to obtain a high TPR and low FPR at the same time no matter how l varies. Therefore,
it is difficult to perform an effective side-channel analysis.
Table 4.2: TPR-FPR with different thresholds
Threshold l l = 0 0 < l ≤ 0.5 0.5 < l ≤ 1
TPR 1 1 0.0193
FPR 1 0.9611 0.0352
A communication channel is built between the counterfeit PMU and software OpenPDC.
All false PMU traffic is accepted by OpenPDC. This shows that the proposed method is capable of
producing false PMU data stream close to real PMU.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, one protocol is transformed into another to disguise the original traffic
and deceive existing network traffic detection approaches, including side-channel analysis. As an
illustration, Zbot C&C traffic is transformed to PMU data stream. The experiment shows that the
syntax of the counterfeit PMU packet is consistent with real PMU traffic. The proposed method
is also resistant to timing side-channel analysis. False PMU packets are accepted by OpenPDC
without any errors. Other target protocols can easily be used.
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(a) Screen-shot of a typical camouflaged Zbot packet (part)
(b) Screen-shot of a typical PMU measurement packet (part)
Figure 4.6: Comparison between camouflaged Zbot packet and PMU measurement packet
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Chapter 5
Denial of Service Attack on Phasor
Measurement Unit
5.1 Overview
The increasing penetration of renewable energy sources such as Photovoltaics (PV) into
the electric grid has advantages as well as disadvantages, specifically solar irradiance variability
and uncertainty [67], [54]. The integration of renewable energy generation into the grid requires
monitoring and the use of advanced control techniques [70], [60]. The deployment of PMUs, however,
can improve grid management to mitigate the challenges of integrating renewable energy sources.
Concerns about the dependability and security of the communications infrastructure are af-
fecting the adoption of synchrophasor technology, making it all the more essential to secure the net-
work connections between PMUs and PDCs to ensure the reliability of smart grid operations [4], [6].
Side-channel analysis extracts information by observing implementation artifacts. In previous stud-
ies, where multiple PMUs transmit measurement packets through a VPN tunnel, packet size and
inter-packet timing side-channels are used to differentiate packet sources [127]. This technique can
be exploited to identify and selectively drop PMU traffic. When real-time PMU data is used for
control, these attacks can cause the power system to become unstable.
In this chapter, the impact of a DoS attack based on tie-line bias control in a two area
system are presented, followed by a description of the experiments performed in a simulated two-
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area four machine power system with a utility-scale PV plant. To illustrate the possible impact, a
three phase-to-ground fault occurs in the power system while one PMU is blocked. The attack is
performed based on side-channel analysis of PMU traffic in a VPN tunnel [127].
5.2 Two Area Four Machine Power System with Utility-Scale
PV Plant and PMUs
~
1 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
3
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Figure 5.1: Two-area four machine power system with a 210 MW PV plant.
Fig. 5.1 shows the two-area four machine power system used in this study with each area
having two synchronous generators, and with each rated at 900 MVA. A 210 MW utility-scale PV
plant is integrated into Area 2. With the variable PV power generation in Area 2, there is a dynamic
tie-line power flow from Area 1 to Area 2. Generator rated values and power outputs used in this
study are shown in Table 1. Each area has an AGC implemented. The AGC in Area 1 (AGC 1) a
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Figure 5.2: The Area 1 AGC (AGC1) diagram for tie-line bias control using PMU data.
diagram of which is detailed in Fig. 6.2 is implemented with tie-line bias control. PMU measured
PV power output and Area 1 frequency values are passed as inputs to AGC 1, which decides the
Area 1 generation by minimizing area control error. Tie-line power flow is regulated to optimally
utilize the PV power generation in Area 1. Table 2 shows the parameters of AGCs used in this
study. PMUs are placed at each power system Bus.
A dedicated communication synchrophasor network is used to transmit PMU measurement
data, the configuration of which is shown in Fig. 5.1. There are four secured subnets connected by
a dedicated network with a security gateway protecting each secured subnet. The attack described
in this study has been found to be robust to issues related to network traffic interactions and
topologies [26], [122]. For ease of presentation, simplified network is used for this study. Virtual
Private Network (VPN) tunnels are established between each of the security gateways with traffic
transmitted through VPN tunnels is encrypted by the security gateway, including the source and
destination addresses. A system PDC is located at the control center subnet collecting data from
PMUs located at Area 1 and the tie line subnet and an area PDC located at Area 2 subnet. The
PMUs located at Area 2 are sending measurement data to the Area PDC. Synchronized measurement
data from multiple PMUs are aligned by the system PDC and used for AGC operation.
The above model is implemented on the Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) [91] facility
at the Real-Time Power and Intelligent Systems (RTPIS) Lab [92] at Clemson University. The
power system is simulated on RTDS, and data used for the power system control is collected using
hardware PMUs.
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Figure 5.3: The symbolization of inter-packet timing delays of legitimate PMU traffic.
5.2.1 PMU Traffic Separation Algorithm
By using packet size and timing side-channels, PMU measurement traffic streams can be
identified and differentiated from within a VPN tunnel. In a dedicated VPN tunnel, one or more
PMU measurement traffic streams can be transferred. The timing side-channel and packet size side-
channel for each PMU stream stays consistent. By using packet size side-channels, PMU streams
that are not of interest can be ignored. Based on the histogram of PMU traffic, shown as Fig. 5.3, a
normalized evaluation map of observed delta time for each symbol can be calculated, shown as Fig.
5.4. For each observed packet, delta times from previously received packets can also be calculated,
and evaluations can be made based on the evaluation map. Unless more than one PMU is sending
packets almost simultaneously, it is relatively easy to differentiate between different PMU streams.
A recursive greedy algorithm is used to separate the traffic [127]. The HMM described in Section
3.3.2 is used to check the separated stream. A flowchart of the packet separation algorithm is given
in Fig. 5.5.
5.2.2 DoS Attack on PMU Measurement Traffic
The system PDC collects measurements from PMUs and Area 2 PDC and send aligned
data to the control center for AGC. The time stamp information in each measurement packet is
then used for data alignment. In OpenPDC, an open source PDC software [7], a parameter called
‘Lag Time’ is used to determine the amount of time to required for the arrival of all the data for a
particular time frame to arrive. If measurement packets are expected but not received within the
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(a) For label ‘a’ (b) For label ‘b’
Figure 5.4: Normalized evaluation map of observed inter-packet delta time.
Figure 5.5: Flowchart of the separation algorithm.
time window, OpenPDC will send only the received data to the system PDC. Missing data positions
are filled in order to keep the format of the aligned data packet constant. A flag in the aligned data
packet indicates the data is invalid [52]. The filler is often a string of zeros, which means without
any countermeasures, using value zero for AGC is harmful to the operation of the power system.
The attacker’s goal then becomes that of subverting the power grid by stealthily halting the
PMU that monitors Bus 7 (Fig. 5.1) from sending measurement data to the control center. Either
simply cutting the wire or blocking all encrypted traffic can be quickly diagnosed. Side-channel
analysis and selectively dropping measurement packets from the target PMU is a more effective
attack. Assume one node between the security gateways has been subverted by an attacker, as shown
in the Wireshark screen in Fig. 5.1. The attacker performs a Man-In-The-Middle attack, then takes
over the connections to the system PDC and carries out a side-channel analysis attack, during which
the attacker drops all measurement data from one PMU without interrupting the connection [127].
When the PMU measurement packets are not delivered within an expected window, the PDC will
send zeros to the control center for AGC. The lack of countermeasures means that AGC 1 keeps
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using zero as input that quickly leads to the power system instability.
The attack approach has been tested in environments with large amounts of extraneous
traffic and shown to be resilient and thus not focused in this study [26], [122]. In this study, a
simplified dedicated network is considered, shown as Fig. 5.1 with PMU 7 selected as the target.
Data measurement traffic from PMU 7 can be identified and blocked by the attacker in a three-step
process. The IP pair of interested security gateways is first identified. The packets that do not agree
with the packet size side-channel are then ignored, and followed by the use of timing side-channels
to identify and block packets from one PMU.
5.2.2.1 In step one, the IP addresses of interested security gateways are identified
Wireshark software is used to interpret the protocol of each packet so that security gateways
send encrypted packets frequently and stably. Wireshark recognizes IP pairs that are sending and
receiving encrypted packets, and three IPs are identified as the security gateways sending PMU
measurements. In this study, each PMU transmits 30 packets per second (30Hz PMU rate). For three
PMUs, 90 packets are transmitted from the security gateway. According to network configuration
shown in Fig. 5.1, Area 1 subnet has 5 PMUs transmitting 150 packets per second; the Area 2
subnet has 6 PMUs transmitting 180 aligned packets per second; and the tie-line subnet has a single
one PMU transmitting 30 packets per second. By validate the number of packets transmitted per
second as well as packet size, the IP of the security gateway securing the Area 1 subnet is identified.
5.2.2.2 In step two, the PMUs are identified by packet size side-Channels
PMU 6 and PMU 7 is the same model with the packet size the same as the default setting.
PMU 1, 2 and 5 are all different PMU models with the packet sizes differing from PMU 6 and PMU
7. A packet size filter is used to ignore PMU 1, 2 and 5.
5.2.2.3 In step three, the PMU packets are selectively dropped
Using the concept described in Section 5.2.1, two PMU measurement streams are differ-
entiated. However, the separation algorithm cannot identify which stream originates from PMU 6
and which originates from PMU 7. The attacker can randomly pick a PMU measurement stream
and drop all packets from that stream. In the analysis, only the results from blocking PMU 7 are
presented.
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Figure 5.6: (a) Frequency predictions with PV integration. (b) Absolute Percentage Error (APE)
of the PV predictions.
5.3 AGC Operation Under Attack
In this study, PMU 7 located at Bus 7 (Fig. 5.1), is used to provide frequency measurement
to the AGC in Area 1, which is subjected to attack. Fig. 5.2 shows the AGC under attack.
5.3.1 Experimental Setup
All experiments and measurements are carried out in the RTPIS Lab in Clemson University.
The PV plant is simulated using real-time weather data from Clemson, SC, and the hardware
security gateways are configured to encrypt and decrypt packets between the hardware PMUs and
OpenPDCs. Wireshark [28] (a network protocol analyzer software) is used to collect data packets,
and the DoS attacks are performed between hardware security gateways.
In the RTPIS Lab, the real-time synchrophasor test bed is used for this study. Capable of
integration with hardware equipment, RTDS is a simulation system that simulates power system
operations in real-time. In this study, the real-time solar irradiance measured within the RTPIS
Lab is used to calculate the PV power in real-time. All the test cases are carried out when the
PV power generation is 88 MW and the corresponding generator power outputs are given in Table
1. The effect of solar irradiance variability and uncertainty in AGC is presented in [54]. In this
study, variable solar irradiance is not considered for the benefit of comparison of test cases. Twelve
Hardware PMUs are used to observe simulated measurement data from RTDS with each hardware
PMU configured to monitoring the frequency, voltage and current of a Bus in the two-area four
machine system, as shown as Fig. 5.1. Hardware PMUs transfer measurement data to OpenPDCs
through the Clemson campus network, and the connections are encrypted with hardware security
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gateways, also shown in Fig. 5.1. The system PDC sends aligned measurement data back to RTDS
through Ethernet connection, with the input from system PDC is configured for AGC control in the
simulated power grid.
To observe the more obvious results, a fault is applied to the power system immediately
after the DoS attacks are performed. A three phase-to-ground ‘fault’ at Bus 8 for ten cycles is
implemented for each experiment. This simulates a trip of a tie-line.
The DoS attacks randomly pick either PMU 6 or PMU 7 to block. To simplify the result
analysis, only the results are presented where PMU 7 is blocked. For Countermeasure A, the
frequency used by the AGC depends on the last frequency received at the beginning of the attack
started, which can be varied in each experiment. Two cases are analyzed for Countermeasure A,
hereafter referred to as ‘Case 1’ and ‘Case 2’. In Case 1, the last frequency received is 60.2Hz, and in
Case 2, the last frequency received is 59.8Hz. The experimental results under different disturbances
as well as the effectiveness of VSN are presented in this section.
5.4 Consequences of DoS Attacks
5.4.1 Fault and attack without countermeasure
The response of the two-area four machine power system after a three-phase to ground fault
at Bus 8 for ten cycles with a DoS attack blocking one, five, and 100 measurement packets from
PMU 7 are presented in Figs. 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
5.4.2 Analysis
The consequences and countermeasures are evaluated from the perspective of system sta-
bility and the energy change according to expected energy to be delivered or generated.
The difference of the energy either delivered or generated that expected in a one minute
window after a fault under each scenario is calculated by:
∆E =
∫ 1
60h
0
(P (t)− PE)dt (5.1)
Where P (t) is the power measured at the tie-line or generators in each cases, and PE is the expected
power either delivered or generated. The results are shown in Table 3 and Fig. 1.
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5.4.2.1 Consequences Without Any Countermeasures
The absence of one to five packets will affected the power generation and the tie-line flow.
The energy delivered on the tie-line also increased dramatically as more packets are been blocked.
The absence of five or more packets caused a forced oscillation on the power generation and tie-line
flow. The absence of 100 or more packets results in system instability.
5.5 Summary
In this study, the consequences of DoS attacks that exploits a side-channel vulnerability in
a synchrophasor network has been demonstrated. The lack of countermeasures greatly increases the
expense of lost PMU measurement packets during system operation. Results indicated that the lack
of additional countermeasures can render the synchrophasor networks vulnerable to a DoS attack,
even if the network communications have been encrypted with security gateways.
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Chapter 6
Virtual Synchrophasor Network
6.1 Overview
In this chapter, the mitigation of a DoS attack on tie-line bias control in a two area system
are presented. This chapter details the creation and implementation of a Cellular Computational
Network (CCN) [68] based Virtual Synchrophasor Network (VSN) for Automatic Generation Control
(AGC), with the objective of mitigating the impact of PV power generation fluctuations and other
disturbances on system frequencies. The topology of the VSN matches the topology of the power
system, which means that during a DoS attack, missing PMU data can be inferred using the VSN.
To illustrate the possible impact, a three phase-to-ground fault occurs in the power system while
one PMU is blocked. The attack is performed based on side-channel analysis of PMU traffic in a
VPN tunnel [127].
6.2 Cellular Computational Network
CCN is a scalable and distributed framework for predicting/estimating the dynamics of
large networked systems [68], [69]. A CCN can be expressed as a directed graph. Fig. 6.1 shows an
example CCN topology. Each of the nodes in a CCN is a computational cell, shown as the square
boxes in Fig. 6.1. Each cell consists of a computational unit, a learning unit, and a communication
unit. Each cell takes an input vector and calculates an output in one time step. Cells can learn to
generate desired output using historical data. The output estimated by each cell can be passed to
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Figure 6.1: CCN based VSN architecture for frequency prediction in 2-area 4-machine power system
with PV plant.
other connected cells as input(s) for further computation. A cell can provide more accurate outputs
from the information provided by interconnected cells, which can be deployed either on a single
computer or multiple computers connected through a network. The type of the computational
unit in a cell depends upon the application, with the goal of predicting/estimating the required
output using the available information. A cell has the ability to learn autonomously, for example
computational intelligence (CI) paradigms such as neural networks and fuzzy systems.
The advantage of CCN is that the topology of a CCN can be designed to match the topology
of the objective power system, permitting the deployment of the cell to local systems. CCN is an
appropriate scalable computational framework to learn and predict/estimate the behavior of a power
system, the topology of which can be mapped to a CCN, where the Buses of the power system can
be simulated by cells. Cells can be learned to follow the characteristics of each component/Bus, and
for each cell, predictions can be made based on information gathered from adjacent connected cells.
By carefully designing a CCN that matches the topology of the objective power system, it is possible
to make predictions based on the dynamics of the power system. In [111], dynamic state estimation
(DSE) of a power system can be made by the CCN even if multiple PMUs’ data is missing.
When the information of a part of the objective power system is not available, the missing in-
formation can be estimated using CCN. Power systems must be closely monitored during unexpected
situations such as security attacks; CCN can provide a better situational awareness/intelligence for
power system operation and control.
In this study, a CCN based VSN architecture is implemented for the two-area four machine
power system by mapping each Bus of the system (Fig. 5.1) to a cell. Cells are connected to their
neighboring cells (mapping adjacent connected Buses), which communicate with each other. Fig.
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6.1 shows the CCN based VSN proposed for this study with arrows indicating the input and output
data flow directions of cells. PMUs are deployed at each Bus of the power system. Implemented cells
use near-real-time and historical data from the PMUs (indicated by solid arrows) and interconnected
cells’ previous time step predicted values (indicated by dash arrows with yellow boxes) to predict
the next state of the PMU data (indicated by dash arrows). Z−1 indicates a single time step delay
that occurs with the acquisition of data from neighboring cells. Each cell in the CCN includes
an extreme learning machine (ELM) as the computational unit. ELM is a type of single hidden
layer feedforward network, where the input to hidden layer weights is assigned randomly. In an
ELM, input to hidden layer weights are kept consistent during the learning process. Thus, ELM
is extremely fast in learning input-output mapping [54]. ELM is more suitable for non-linear time
series predictions. Specifically, if a PMU is attacked, the communication capability with adjacent
connected Buses aids each cell to provide accurate predictions at which point the missing data values
are estimated by a VSN and used for the AGC operation. ELM based CCN frequency prediction
approach for two-area four-machine power system is presented in [53], which clearly explains the
development and application of ELM including its training and testing methods used in this study.
6.3 AGC Operation Under Attack
In this study, PMU 7 located at Bus 7 (Fig. 5.1), is used to provide frequency measurement
to the AGC in Area 1, which is subjected to attack. Fig. 6.3 shows the flowchart for the test cases.
From each time stamp t, the PMU packet receiver waits ∆t time till a packet arrives. At time t+∆t
a flag status is checked and different test cases are followed based on the status of the flag. If a
packet has arrived before t+ ∆t, the flag is set to 0, and the received value is used for AGC control.
To study the consequence of PMU packet dropping without any countermeasure, the flag is set to
0, and the frequency value 0 is sent to the AGC if a PMU packet is not received until t + ∆t. To
study the effect of countermeasures, if the packet is not received on time, the flag status is set to
either 1 or 2, and a countermeasure is implemented to replace the missing data. There are two types
of countermeasures, A and B. Countermeasure A uses the last received data to replace the missing
data, and Countermeasure B uses the CCN based VSN estimated data to replace the missing data.
The two countermeasure approaches are implemented and deployed on a computer in which
OpenPDC is installed at the control center. Fig. 6.2 shows the AGC switching behavior based on
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the frequency input value of the flag.
Figure 6.3: The flowchart for AGC operations under DoS attacks. This includes four possible cases
studied: 1) packet arrived before t + ∆t and used for AGC; 2) packet did not arrive before t + ∆t
and value ‘0’ is used for AGC; 3) packet did not arrive before t+ ∆t and last arrived value is used
for AGC; 4) packet did not arrive before t+ ∆t and VSN estimated value is used for AGC.
6.3.1 Countermeasure A
For Bus i, the last received data fi(t) at time t is sent to replace the missing data at time
t + ∆t. If the system keeps missing data over multiple continuous time intervals, then the data
received at time t is sent to AGC continuously until the flag status changes.
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6.3.2 Countermeasure B
For Bus i, VSN predicted frequency fˆi(t + ∆t) is used to replace the missing data at time
t+∆t. Similar to Countermeasure A, if the system continues to missing data for multiple continuous
time intervals, the VSN predicted frequency value fˆi(t+2∆t) based on previously predicted frequency
value fˆi(t+ ∆t) is used for AGC.
6.3.2.1 Single time step predictions
The input vector for cell i is given by (6.1)
finput(i)(t) = {fi(t), fi(t−∆t), ..., fi(t− 9∆t), ...,
ˆfj(t), fj(t−∆t), ..., fj(t− 9∆t)}
(6.1)
where fi(t) is measured i
th Bus frequency at time t, ˆfj(t) is the predicted j
th Bus frequency at time
t, fj(t −∆t) is measured jth Bus frequency at t −∆t, j represents all the neighboring Buses, and
∆t is the prediction time step. In this study ∆t is 33 ms.
The output of cell i is the predicted frequency fˆi(t+ ∆t) at time t+ ∆t.
For example, the input for frequency prediction at cell 7 at time t + ∆t is using Bus 7
historical frequency values and neighboring Buses historical frequency values as given by (6.2).
finput(7)(t) = {f7(t− 9∆t), ..., f7(t), f6(t− 9∆t), ...,
ˆf6(t), f8(t− 9∆t), ..., ˆf8(t)}
(6.2)
The output of cell 7, which is the predicted frequency data fˆ7(t + ∆t) at time t + ∆t, is
calculated according to (6.3)
fˆ7(t+ ∆t) = sig(Win × finput(7)(t) + bias)×Wout (6.3)
where Win and Wout are the respective input and output weights of the ELM. The sigmoid function
is used as the activation function.
Fig. 5.6 shows the single time step ahead (33ms) frequency prediction results obtained for
the frequency at Bus 7 with PV power variability.
62
6.3.2.2 Recursive frequency predictions
If the system keeps missing data packets for multiple ∆t time intervals, VSN recursively
uses its predicted values in input function. Fig. 6.4 shows an example of recursive VSN prediction
procedure for Bus 7 for two consecutive ∆t time intervals. The data from PMU 7 at time t+∆t and
t + 2∆t are not delivered on time. Please note that at time t + ∆t, data from neighboring PMUs
are delivered and used for prediction at time t+ 2∆t.
Figure 6.4: Recursive VSN prediction procedure for Bus 7 for two consecutive ∆t time intervals.
6.4 Experiment and Results Analysis
6.4.1 Experimental Setup
The attacks presented in this chapter shares the same setup with the previous chapter5.3.1.
The DoS attacks randomly pick either PMU 6 or PMU 7 to block. To simplify the result analysis,
only the results are presented where PMU 7 is blocked. For Countermeasure A, the frequency used
by the AGC depends on the last frequency received at the beginning of the attack started, which
can be varied in each experiment. Two cases are analyzed for Countermeasure A, hereafter referred
to as ‘Case 1’ and ‘Case 2’. In Case 1, the last frequency received is 60.2Hz, and in Case 2, the last
frequency received is 59.8Hz. The experimental results under different disturbances as well as the
effectiveness of VSN are presented in this section.
6.4.1.1 Fault and attack with Countermeasure A deployed
The response of the two-area four machine power system, where Countermeasure A is de-
ployed, after a three-phase to ground fault at Bus 8 for ten cycles with a DoS attack blocking 5 and
300 measurement packets from PMU 7 are presented in Figs. 5 and 6 respectively.
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6.4.1.2 Fault and attack with Countermeasure B deployed
The response of the two-area four machine power system, where Countermeasure B is de-
ployed, after a three-phase to ground fault at Bus 8 for ten cycles with a DoS attack blocking 5 and
300 measurement packets from PMU 7 are presented in Figs. 7 and 8 respectively.
6.4.2 Analysis
The countermeasures are evaluated from the perspective of system stability and the energy
change according to expected energy to be delivered or generated.
The difference of the energy either delivered or generated that expected in a one minute
window after a fault under each scenario is calculated by:
∆E =
∫ 1
60h
0
(P (t)− PE)dt (6.4)
Where P (t) is the power measured at the tie-line or generators in each cases, and PE is the expected
power either delivered or generated. The results are shown in Table 3 and Fig. 1.
6.4.2.1 Countermeasure A
The use of old frequency data to replace the missing measurement data stabilized the power
system, and no forced oscillation in power generation and tie-line power flow is observed. However,
the occurrence of a DoS attack at a very high system frequency of 60.2Hz deceived the AGC in Area
1 which reduced the power generation in Area 1. To mitigate this power loss, the power generation at
Area 2 is increased. Similarly, the AGC in Area 1 is again deceived by a very low system frequency of
59.8Hz, which in this case increased the power generation in Area 1. The power delivered on tie-line
is increased, and power generated in Area 2 is reduced. Although not experimentally observed, this
increase in power either delivered or generated can trip the tie-line or synchronous generators.
6.4.2.2 Countermeasure B
The use of CCN predicted frequency data to replace the missing measurement data showed
no obvious effects on power system operation, power generation and tie-line flow.
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6.5 Summary
In this chapter, the CCN is used to develop a VSN that estimate the missing data during
DoS attacks. The ability to accurately estimate the frequency change trends during the DoS attack
makes it possible to deliver the results demonstrated in this chapter.
The VSN provides an innovative solution for adopting PMU measurement data for closed-
loop control. The VSN is realized using a cellular computational network to predict frequency at
the power system buses when real-time data is not available. The real-time implementation of DoS
attacks and mitigation of damage using VSN validated the effectiveness of the proposed method for
frequency prediction. A countermeasure that simply uses last received data is found ineffective in
mitigating damage especially the change of energy delivered or generated during a severe event.
The original intention in deploying synchrophasor devices is for reducing the system op-
eration cost while increasing both revenue and service quality. However, the cost of a guaranteed
delivery of real-time PMU measurement data is expensive. According to the results presented in this
study, the CCN based VSN prediction is validated as a practical solution that effectively reduces
both the cost and risk of adopting PMU in closed-loop applications. Also, this proposed CCN based
VSN can increase the resiliency of power system operations to DoS attacks, thus enhancing the
reliability with variable generation systems (e.g. large solar farm integrated power system). This
novel VSN technology in turn makes it possible to minimize the penalties from the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). Further study shall be performed to evaluate the reliability
improvement by applying the proposed VSN to smart grid operations [93].
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Chapter 7
VSN Resiliency
7.1 Overview
In the previous study, a Virtual Synchrophasor Network (VSN) based on a cellular compu-
tational network (CCN) that infers missing PMU measurement data during a DoS attacks is used.
VSN is proven effectively mitigate damage during a DoS attack against a single PMU that concur-
rent with a three-phase touch ground fault. The system can stabilize even after 600 packets have
dropped during an attack [131].
In this study, the resiliency of the VSN is further tested by mitigating DoS attacks on
multiple PMUs at the same time. This study tested the VSN technique on both the previously
studied two-area four machine power system and the IEEE 68 bus system. The computation unit
in each cell is trained to further adapt to harsher situations such as a severe system fault during
multiple DoS attacks.
7.2 Virtual Synchrophasor Network
The CCN based VSN shown in Fig. 5.1 with dash arrows indicating the input and output
data flow directions of Cells. The topology of the VSN follows the topology of the two area four
machines network with each Cell mapped to a PMU that provides frequency measurements. The
power system takes frequency data from Bus 7 and Bus 9 as AGC 1 and AGC 2 input repeatedly.
Thus, that two PMUs are considered as the primary layer PMUs. PMU 6, PMU 8 and PMU 10 are
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secondary layer PMUs, which are the direct neighbors to the primary layer PMUs. Finally, PMU 5,
PMU 11 and PMU 12 are considered as tertiary layer PMUs.
The computational unit in each Cell is a one hidden-layer feedforward neural network, with
nine historical measurement data from both the corresponding PMU and neighboring PMUs, one
current measurement data from the corresponding PMU and one inferred frequency data from each
of the neighboring Cells. The number of neurons in the hidden-layer is three times of the number
of input neurons. The input layer and output layer of the neural are using linear activation whereas
the hidden-layer uses sigmoid activation function. Under cases such as DoS attack s or network
delays where the measurement data from PMUs are not immediately available, the input for the
next iteration of inference will switch to the previously inferred frequency data.
There are two stages of learning to develop the proposed VSN. In the first stage, the VSN
learns with data captured during operations without DoS attacks. In the second stage, some of the
input streams of VSN is disabled to create simulated DoS attack scenarios. For both stages, the
learning data is generated using the two area four machine system simulated by RTDS simulation
system. The learning data is captured during system operations without DoS attacks but with
several system faults. The faults are 10 cycle three phase to ground fault at Bus 8.
Very few learning epochs are performed in the first stage to avoid local minimization. In
the second stage, several attack patterns are designed and listed in Table 7.1. In each epoch, an
attack pattern is selected from the table. The PMUs streams under simulated attacks are disabled
during that epoch. The VSN has to switch the input to previously inferred data for those data that
are not available. At the beginning of each epoch, a random value is used as the input to avoid a
deadlock, since no output is generated from any Cells yet.
The developed VSN is then integrated with the hardware PMUs and RTDS for simulation,
where the VSN is taken input from the hardware PMUs and the output from VSN Cell 7 and Cell
9 are then sent to the AGCs in RTDS real-time simulation. The AGCs select either the hardware
measurement data when it is available or the VSN inferred data when the hardware measurement
data is not immediately available.
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Table 7.1: Simulated DoS patterns for the second training stage.
PMU ID 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Pattern 1 (P* layer) x
Pattern 2 (P layer) x
Pattern 3 (S layer) x
Pattern 4 (S layer) x
Pattern 5 (S layer) x
Pattern 6 (T layer) x
Pattern 7 (T layer) x
Pattern 8 (T layer) x
Pattern 9 (PST layer) x x x x x x x
Pattern 10 (PST layer) x x x x x x x
Pattern 11 (PST layer) x x x x x x x
Pattern 12 (PST layer) x x x x x x x
Pattern 13 (PST layer) x x x x x x x
Pattern 14 (PST layer) x x x x x x x
Pattern 15 (PST layer) x x x x x x x
Pattern 16 (PST layer) x x x x x x x
Pattern 17 (PT layer) x x x x
Pattern 18 (ST layer) x x x x
*‘P’, ‘S’ and ‘T’ are the abbreviations of ‘Primary’, ‘Secondary’, and ‘Tertiary’ respectively. PMU
Data feeds marked with x are disabled in the respective training pattern.
7.3 System Resiliency with VSN
7.3.1 VSN Resiliency on Two Area Four Machines System
Fig. 5.1 shows the experiment environment including the physical layer, the VSN layer,
and the two AGCs. In the hardware layer, the two-area four machine power system is used in this
study. Each area has two synchronous generators, and with each rated at 900 MVA. A 210 MW,
utility-scale PV plant, is integrated into Area 2. With the variable PV power generation in Area 2,
there is a dynamic tie-line power flow control from Area 1 to Area 2. An AGC is implemented in
each area.
PV power output and Area 1 frequency values from PMU 7 are passed as inputs to AGC
1, which dispatches the Area 1 generation by minimizing area control error. Tie-line power flow is
regulated to utilize the PV power generation in Area 1 optimally. The Area 2 frequency measured
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by PMU 9 is sent to AGC 2.
The DoS attack experiments exams the VSN by gradually increasing the number of layers
of PMUs been attacked as well as the attack time in each experiment concurrent with a 10 cycle
three phase to ground system fault at Bus 8. Fig. 7.1 shows the time frames of each stage of the
attack. The frequency response, total energy change, and the cumulate absolute percentage error
(CAPE) are the three factors used to evaluate the performance of the VSN under each attack.
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Figure 7.1: The illustration of time frames of the DoS attack experiments.
The attack experiments are performed in the following fashion: First, consider the number
of PMUs been attacked. There are four groups of attacks, start from attacking at single PMU at the
primary layer. Then attack the primary layer. Then attack the primary layer and secondary layer.
Finally attacks against all three layers of PMUs except PMU 12. Then, consider the duration of
each DoS attack. In each group of attacks, the duration of the DoS attacks performed is 2 seconds
(60 packets drop), 5 seconds (150 packets drop), 10 seconds (300 packets drop) and 20 seconds (600
packets drop). There is a total of 12 experiments performed. In all experiments, the system fault is
applied one second following the DoS attack.
7.3.2 VSN Resiliency on IEEE 68-Bus System
In addition to the test on the two area four machine system, a VSN for IEEE 68-bus system
was trained and tested. Similar to the two area four machine system, Figure 7.2 shows the IEEE
68-Bus System with VSN that having the same topology. Similarly, the 68-bus system uses some
of the PMUs for AGC. Those PMUs are considered as the primary PMUs. In this system, there
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are four layers of PMUs determined based the number of hops from a PMU to any of the primary
PMUs.
For this system, we tested under ten different PV penetration levels, shown in Table 7.2,
and 100 different attacks under each operating condition for a total of 1000 experiments. Start from
no PMUs under attack; every two following attack conditions attacks one more PMU. For example,
no PMUs are attacked in case 0 and 1. One of the PMUs is attacked in case 2, and 3. 49 PMUs
are attacked in case 98 and 99. PMUs closer to primary layer will be attacked first. In this system,
11 PMUs are used for AGC. Those 11 PMUs will be attacked first in attack case 2 to 23. In those
attack cases, the PMUs under attack are randomly selected among primary PMUs. There are 14
PMUs in the secondary layer. For attack case 24 to 51, all 11 PMUs in the primary layer is attacked,
PMUs in the secondary layer is randomly selected. So on and so forth.
Table 7.2: Ten Operating Conditions.
Operating Condition Case ID PV1(MW) PV2(MW)
0 0 0
1 85 170
2 125 250
3 165 330
4 205 410
5 245 490
6 285 570
7 325 650
8 365 730
9 405 810
7.4 Results and Analysis
7.4.1 VSN Resiliency Results on Two Area Four Machines System
Before the attacks, the total energy transferred on the tie-line in one minute EE is recorded
as the benchmark to calculate the total energy change after each attack. The total energy change δ
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Figure 7.2: The illustration of IEEE 68-Bus System with VSN integrated.
is calculated as follows:
δ = (
∫ 1
60h
0
P (t)dt− EE)/EE × 100% (7.1)
Where P (t) is the power measured at the tie-line. The CAPE is calculated only during the DoS
attacks and as follows:
CAPE =
∫ TAttack
0
| ˆfi(t)− fi(t)|/60× 100%dt (7.2)
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Where fi(t) is the system measured frequency at PMU i, ˆfi(t) is the VSN inferred frequency at Cell
i, TAttack is the duration of the attack.
RTDS simulates power system in real-time, and each attack experiment last around 10
minute. It is not feasible to calculate confident interval with hundreds of simulations. To get
relatively reliable results, all variables mentioned in above formulas are calculated using an average
of the results produced in 10 experiments.
The average of total energy transfered on the tie-line in one minute with a fault but without
any attack is 3.3321 MWh.
Figs. 7.9 and 7.10 show the average of the CAPE for each experiment. As expected, the
longer the attack, the higher the CAPE. However, with more PMUs under attack, the CAPE is not
necessarily getting higher in some cases. By comparing with Figs. 7.3 to 7.8, it is obvious that the
VSN can perform very well when only primary layer PMUs are attacked. With more PMUs and
even all PMUs except PMU 12 attacked, the VSN can still imply the actual frequency trend.
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Figure 7.3: Frequency response at Bus 7 during attack on primary layer PMUs for 20 seconds.
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Figure 7.4: Frequency response at Bus 9 during attack on primary layer PMUs for 20 seconds.
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Figure 7.5: Frequency response at Bus 7 during attack on primary layer and secondary PMUs for
20 seconds.
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Figure 7.6: Frequency response at Bus 9 during attack on primary layer and secondary PMUs for
20 seconds.
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Figure 7.7: Frequency response at Bus 7 during attack on all PMUs except PMU 12 for 20 seconds.
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Figure 7.8: Frequency response at Bus 9 during attack on all PMUs except PMU 12 for 20 seconds.
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Figure 7.9: The accumulate absolute percentage error of Cell 7 frequency predictions under each
attack case.
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Figure 7.10: The accumulate absolute percentage error of Cell 9 frequency predictions under each
attack case.
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7.4.2 VSN Resiliency Results on IEEE 68-Bus System
The one minute Control Performance Standards CPS1 was used to evaluate the results in
this section. The one minute CPS1 is calculated using the following equation:
ACE1min/(−10 ∗Beta) ∗MeanDeltaFrequency
where ACE1min is the average ace over one minute window; MeanDeltaFrequency is the average
of absolute delta frequency over one minute window.
The results are presented in heat-map Figs 7.11 to 7.11. The vertical axis presents different
operating conditions. The horizontal axis presents different percentage of PMUs under attacked.
The brighter the color, the higher the CPS1. Similar to the results in the two are four machine
system, there is no observable increase of CPS1 as more PMUs under attack. That means, the VSN
successfully mitigated multiple DoS attacks in IEEE 68 Bus system.
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Figure 7.11: CPS1 of area one under different operation conditions and attacks.
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Figure 7.12: CPS1 of area two under different operation conditions and attacks.
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Figure 7.13: CPS1 of area three under different operation conditions and attacks.
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Figure 7.14: CPS1 of area four under different operation conditions and attacks.
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Figure 7.15: CPS1 of area five under different operation conditions and attacks.
7.5 Summary
In this study, two VSNs has been developed to mitigate concurrent DoS attacks during a
power system disturbance in two area four machines system and IEEE 68-bus system respectively.
A set of DoS attacks are performed against the developed VSN with system faults to evaluate that
the VSN can be used to mitigate DoS attacks. The experiments and results prove the robustness of
the VSN technology. The VSN is an ideal countermeasure to response to delay or missing frequency
measurement data.
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With more than 80% of PMUs disconnected in either systems for 20 seconds during system
faults, the VSN can still infer the system frequency response, and further, makes the tie-line bias
control resilient to DoS attacks. The experiments presented in this study demonstrated the capability
of the VSN under server DoS attacks. With 7 out of 8 PMUs disconnected for 20 seconds during a
system fault, the VSN can still infer the trend of the system frequency response, and further, makes
the AGC able to control the power generation and eventual get the system back to stable.
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Chapter 8
Border Gateway Protocol
Hijacking Detection
8.1 Overview
The Internet is a public network; encryption methods are commonly used to ensure the
privacy and authenticity. However, the encryption does not protect the communication route from
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks and Denial of Service (DOS) attacks and does not guarantee
the latency of the communication. Any unexpected change of the variance of the packet delay can
cause instability in the smart grid.
For communication between different IP prefixes, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing
mechanism determines the route. BGP is used by Autonomous Systems (AS) to exchange routing
information. Every BGP update message can affect the routing of the entire Internet. Usually,
the traffic sender and receiver will not be aware in advance of the change caused by BGP traffic
engineering. Also, the BGP routing mechanism is subject to MITM attacks. This is usually called
BGP hijacking attack.
BGP attacks usually follow with other attacks, such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
Thus, the BGP hijacking detection can be used as a pre-alarm for possible attacks shortly. BGP
hijacking is one of the easiest ways to perform Man In The Middle (MITM) attacks. Establish air
gaped networks for the smart grid is not practical, and PMU to PDC communication is subject to
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BGP hijacking attack either intentional or unintentionally. However, no existing method can quickly
detect a BGP route change.
In this chapter, we present experiments to study the performance of using CUSUM and F-
Test algorithms to detect BGP hijacking attacks on the PEERING testbed1. The PEERING testbed
owns multiple BGP routers and IP prefixes on the Internet. Thus, this unique testbed is capable
of performing real attacks on the real Internet without causing real damages. The attacks hijacked
a PMU to PDC communication route and caused additional latency to the data transmission. We
used absolute delay side-channel and inter-packet delay side-channel to detect BGP route update.
8.2 Border Gateway Protocol in Smart Grid
In a distributed system such as smart grid, information needs to be shared between subsys-
tems. Those messages need to be delivered timely in-order for the system to make real-time decisions.
For long distance communication, the Internet is a common choice of communication media. Net-
work traffic over a long distance will travel through a backbone network. A backbone network might
be shared among different service providers. The network traffic for smart grid communication will
be transmitted through those backbone networks and thus shared with other network traffic.
The network traffic route on the backbone network is subject to change. The route selection
depends on a variety of parameters, such as bandwidth, latency, load, pricing, contract, and even
misconfigurations or BGP hijacking attacks. Packets travel on the Internet will go through many
devices. Many of the devices are ignoring network probing packets for security reasons. Thus it
is impossible to know if a route is updated. Once a network route is changed, the latency usually
changes as well. Figs 8.1 and 8.2 shows some incidences of latency change observed when transmitting
PMU measurement traffic over the Internet.
8.3 Border Gateway Protocol Hijacking
The BGP hijacking attacks are performed using the PEERING testbed. The PEERING
owns multiple IP prefixes, AS numbers and BGP routers on the Internet. The testbed provides
authorized users to access and control the BGP routers controlled by PEERING. Authorized users
1PEERING is a system that provides safe and easy access for researchers and educators to the Internet’s BGP
routing system, enabling and inspiring transformational research. https://peering.usc.edu [83]
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Figure 8.1: The latency is changing over time.
Figure 8.2: An incidence of an unexpected latency change that might cause by a network traffic
route change. The average latency increased to 0.6 seconds. This incidence lasted for about an
hour.
can change the routing table and broadcast BGP messages to the Internet through those BGP
routers. The messages are checked by the PEERING testbed before send. If the BGP message can
potentially harm the Internet, the message will be blocked before sending. In this study, we are
allocated to use two prefixes: 184.164.244.0/24 and 184.164.245.0/24. We used two BGP routers to
perform the BGP hijacking attack.
During the experiment, we captured the PMU messages and the arriving time of each
message. The PMU messages are transmitted by PMUs to an OpenPDC running in a computer
using the Synchrophasor Protocol. Each of the synchrophasor messages contains a GPS time tag
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indicating the time that the packet was sent out. The computer receives the synchrophasor messages
can calculate the inter-packet delay and absolute delay of the message. Any pattern change in the
latency or inter-packet delay may indicate a possible BGP hijacking attack.
Figs 8.3 shows the four stages during the BGP hijacking attack experiment. In stage one,
Fig 8.3a, we announced both prefixes from the BGP router at Phoenix. We configure PMU A to send
measurement data to 184.164.245.100 and PMU B to send measurement data to 184.164.244.100. In
the second stage, Fig 8.3b, we simulate a BGP hijacking attack by announcing the 184.164.244.0/24
prefix at the BGP router at Amsterdam without withdrawing that prefix from the BGP router at
Phoenix. In the third stage, the announcement takes effect, and the traffic from PMU B is routed
through Amsterdam.
As not all the broadcast messages are going through the PEERING testbed, we use the
arriving time series from PMU A as the control group.
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Figure 8.3: The four stages of BGP hijacking attack experiments performed in this study.
8.4 Packet Timing Side-Channel Analysis
In practice, BGP route change might not have a significant effect on the absolute delays. It
is necessary to analyze both the absolute delays and inter-packet delays.
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Figure 8.4: The absolute delays of PMU traffic before and after the BGP routing switched from
Phoenix to Amsterdam.
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Figure 8.5: The absolute delays of PMU traffic before and after the BGP routing switched from
Amsterdam to Phoenix.
Figs 8.4, 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7 shows typical patterns of absolute delays and inter-packet delays
during a BGP route change occurred at around 18000 packets. In Figs 8.4 and 8.6, the route from
the victim PMU is changed from going through Phoenix to going through Amsterdam. The absolute
delays increased; the variance of inter-packet delay decreased. Similarly, in Figs 8.5 and 8.7 shows a
decrease of absolute delays; and increase of the variance of inter-packet delay after the BGP hijacking
attack finished.
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Figure 8.6: The inter-packet delays of PMU traffic before and after the BGP routing switched from
Phoenix to Amsterdam
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Figure 8.7: The inter-packet delays of PMU traffic before and after the BGP routing switched from
Amsterdam to Phoenix.
We use two well-studied algorithms CUSUM [105] and F-Test [55] to perform the analysis.
The CUSUM algorithm has been used for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack detection
[81,106]. The F-Test is a popular statistical test used to detect sample variance change.
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8.4.1 Cumulative Sum (CUSUM)
The CUSUM algorithm is used to detect extreme traffic volume increases hidden in bursty
background traffic. In the CUSUM algorithm, attacks are detected using a sequential probability
ratio test (SPRT) [25].
Here we use a modified version of the CUSUM algorithm based on [81]. Let L[t], t > 0, is
the latency of packet arrived at time t. If a BGP hijacking starts at time λ, the latency will change:
L[t] =

L0[t] 0 < t < λ
L1[t] t ≥ λ
If we assume L0[t] and L1[t] are independent and their means are m0[t] and m1[t] respec-
tively.
The original sequential probability ratio test requires pre and post-change information to
solve the problem. To address this issue, we use a modified version based on [106]. The method
calculates the difference between the current and long-term average of the observations. If the
current average changes faster than the long-term average, the CUSUM coefficient also increases.
The CUSUM coefficient goes back to zero when the difference between the two averages is small.
When the CUSUM coefficient exceeds the chosen threshold, it indicates a packets latency change
which may be caused by a BGP hijacking attack. This CUSUM process can be summarized as:
S[t] = max{0, S[t− 1] + |mS [t]−mL[t]|}; S[0] = 0
were S[t−1] is the old CUSUM value, mS [t] is the short window average of packets’ latency,
mL[t] is the long-term average of packets’ latency, calculated with a given long term average memory
parameter ε, 0 < ε < 1:
mL[t] = εmL[t− 1] + (1− ε)mS [t]; mL[0] = 0
To reduce high frequency noise, we use local averaging memory α as a low-pass filter:
m˜S [t] = αmS [t] + (1− α)m˜S [t− 1]; m˜S [0] = 0
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High values for ε make the average emphasize the long term average value in mL[t]. Larger
values for α make the average emphasize the current value in mS [t].
With the above equations, we have the modified CUSUM algorithm:
S˜[t] = max{0, (S˜[t− 1] + |m˜S [t]−mL[t]| − C)}; S˜[0] = 0
where C is multiplication of mL[t] and correction parameter ce which forces the cusum coefficient
values to 0by adding more weight to long term average mL[t].
As an example, we take the absolute latency data presented in Figs 8.4 and 8.5 as inputs
for the proposed CUSUM algorithm. Figs 8.8 and 8.9 show the output of the CUSUM algorithm.
The output from the proposed CUSUM algorithm generate a high peak quickly after a BGP route
change.
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Figure 8.8: The CUSUM of absolute delays of PMU traffic before and after the BGP routing switched
from Phoenix to Amsterdam.
8.4.2 F-Test
F-Test compares the variance of two data sets. We use similar approach as the modified
CUSUM algorithm. We let vS [t] be the variance of the data in a short term window at time t, vL[t]
be the variance of the data in long term window at time t. Then we have our F-Test algorithm as
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Figure 8.9: The CUSUM of absolute delays of PMU traffic before and after the BGP routing switched
from Amsterdam to Phoenix.
follows:
F [t] = |vS [t]− vL[t]|
As an example, we take the absolute latency data and inter-packet delay data presented in
Figs 8.4, 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7 as input for the F-Test algorithm. The results are shown in Figs 8.10,
8.11, 8.12, and 8.13. The F-Test generate a high peak a moment later after a BGP route change.
However, the F-Test generates a lot of noises. We can see some small peaks before the BGP route
change, shown in Fig 8.11 in. By looking at the original inter-packet delay data shown in Fig 8.6,
we can see that the variance are gradually changing before the BGP route change.
8.5 Results
We apply the above described CUSUM algorithm and F-Test algorithm on the absolute
delay and inter-packet delay of the captured traffic. ROC curves are created based on the attack
records, shown in Figs 8.14 to 8.17.
The ROC curves show that the proposed CUSUM algorithm is capable of detecting the
BGP route change using the absolute delays of traffic with high True Positive Rate (TPR) and low
False Positive Rate (FPR). However, as the mean of inter-packet delays is not affected much by
the BGP route change, the CUSUM algorithm provides no meaningful information when analyzing
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Figure 8.10: The F-Test of absolute delays of PMU traffic before and after the BGP routing switched
from Phoenix to Amsterdam.
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Figure 8.11: The F-Test of inter-packet delays of PMU traffic before and after the BGP routing
switched from Phoenix to Amsterdam.
the inter-packet delay data. The proposed F-Test can detect BGP route change on both the inter-
packet delay data and the absolute delay data. Compare to the CUSUM test; the F-Test provides
higher TPR and FPR on the inter-packet delay data. Further analysis is needed to combine the two
algorithms.
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Figure 8.12: The F-Test of absolute delays of PMU traffic before and after the BGP routing switched
from Amsterdam to Phoenix.
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Figure 8.13: The F-Test of inter-packet delays of PMU traffic before and after the BGP routing
switched from Amsterdam to Phoenix.
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Figure 8.14: ROC of applying CUSUM algorithm on the PMU packets’ absolute delay for BGP
hijacking detection. The best operation point gives 91.56% TPR and 4.47% FPR
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Figure 8.15: ROC of applying F-Test algorithm on the PMU packets’ absolute delay for BGP
hijacking detection. The best operation point gives 97.72% TPR and 6.35% FPR
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Figure 8.16: ROC of applying CUSUM algorithm on the PMU packets’ inter-packet delay for BGP
hijacking detection. The best operation point gives 50% TPR and 56% FPR
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Figure 8.17: ROC of applying F-Test algorithm on the PMU packets’ inter-packet delay for BGP
hijacking detection. The best operation point gives 89.61% TPR and 14.12% FPR
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8.6 Summary
The absolute delays and the inter-packet delays of the captured traffic shown some interest-
ing pattern. As expected, the absolute delays of traffic when routed through Amsterdam is generally
longer than it takes when routed through Phoenix. However, the Phoenix route has higher variance,
and the timing patterns are changing over time. That pattern could be the result of an artifact
of that specific path. Due to the lack of data source, we could only perform experiments using
the above-mentioned routes. More data should be acquired in future research to establish a more
concrete conclusion.
92
Chapter 9
Game Theory Analysis
9.1 Overview
The smart grid is a distributed system that expected to be capable of satisfying stringent
system safety and performance requirements. The communication system in the smart grid is usually
maintained by the third party service providers. In the previous chapters, we discussed several
communication network vulnerabilities in a smart grid and mitigation methods such as VSN. In this
chapter use the game theory-based methodology to develop a mitigation strategy that can tolerate
the worst case scenario.
A smart grid relies on a variety of data inputs, including remote PMU measurements. The
PMU measurements are transmitted through the Internet, which presents a large attack surface.
Our threat model takes into account the data communication route hijacking and several following
attacks after a successful BGP hijacking attack. As discussed in Chapter 8, BGP route hijacking is
very easy to apply. This type of attacks are frequently happing and sometimes caused by human
mistakes. During such attacks, the latency between two subsystems can change abruptly.
To find the best countermeasure strategy, we perform a classic Two-Person Zero-Sum
(TPZS) game [29] analysis. We established multiple attack strategies and mitigation strategies.
As AGC requires accurate and timely frequency data, we use the frequency estimation error to
calculate the payoff matrix.
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9.2 Two-Person Zero-Sum (TPZS) game
Two-Person Zero-Sum (TPZS) game is a classic non-cooperative finite game theory model.
In this model, two players have opposite interests. Each player has one or more strategies. With
one player’s strategies counterparts the other player’s strategies, a payoff matrix can be built. For
each combination of strategies from both players, the sum of one player’s gain and the other player’s
loss is zero.
In this study, we assume the frequency data are used for AGC. The measured or estimated
frequency used for AGC could be different from the real frequency. We use the accumulated frequency
differences over 90 seconds, ∆f , as the evaluation metrics for the payoff matrix. Smaller ∆f will
lead to better power system stability. The attacker wants to disturb the power system and thus
prefer larger ∆f .
To solve the game, we need to test if a saddle point exists for the available attacks and
countermeasures. A saddle point is where the strategy combination caused the minimax ∆f among
all attacks is also the same combination that caused the maximin ∆f among all countermeasures.
In another word, neither party in the game can do better that the combination. If there is no saddle
point, the game can be solved by finding Nash Equilibrium strategies.
9.2.1 Payoff Matrices
Here we give a formal definition of the payoff matrices. In a power system, a set of PMUs P
are deployed at some Buses B measuring frequencies. At each time point t, for each Bus i in B, the
real frequency, or the ground truth, is denoted as F ig(t). At the same time point, a frequency value
for each Bus can be retrieved from PMU, or estimated using one of the mitigation strategies. This
estimated frequency at time t is denoted as F ie(t). The delta between the estimated frequency and
the real frequency at time t for Bus i can be calculated by |F ie(t)−F ig(t)|. Then the accumulated delta
frequency among all Buses over 90 seconds of operation can be calculated as the payoff function.
The above mentioned payoff function can be expressed as the following formula:
t=90∑
t=0
∑
i∈B
|F ie(t)− F ig(t)|
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9.2.2 Attacks and Countermeasures
The analyzed strategies for the attackers are BGP hijacking attack; drop PMUs; random
packet delays. We consider the artifact of BGP hijacking attack causes longer delay. The drop of
PMUs attack drops victim PMUs’ data measurements. The random delay might happen when the
attacker is performing some analysis on the hijacked traffic.
The available countermeasures are: use zero to replace missing or delayed frequency data;
use sixty to replace the missing or delayed data; use the last available data to replace the missing
or delayed data; use the SCADA system; and finally using VSN’s output to replace the missing or
delayed data. The SCADA system uses Remote Terminal Units instead of PMUs and operates at
0.5Hz. The SCADA system will not be affected hen PMUs are attacked.
Please note that, without any attack, packets can still be delayed. In such a case, one of
the countermeasure strategies can be applied to fill the delayed data. The frequency of such delay
is estimated using the real PMU operation data captured in Chapter 8.
9.2.3 Z-Test
The evaluation of each attack and countermeasure pair are estimated based on the simulation
of the IEEE 68 Buses System. First, we perform power system simulations under 100 different oper-
ating conditions without any attack or countermeasure. We captured the frequency measurements
on 58 PMUs located throughout the power system. Then, we replay the captured measurement
data and apply simulated attacks and countermeasures. The simulated attacks alter the packets’
delivery time. The modified traffic is then used as the input for mitigation strategies. Each attack
and mitigation pair is evaluated under all 100 different operation conditions. The average, variance
and the 95% confidence interval are calculated for each combination.
To determine whether one strategy is better than the other, Z-Test is used. Z-Test can be
used to estimate the null hypothesis of two data set. With two independent data set X and Y , the
hypothesis of µx = µy against µx 6= µy of the means of X and Y with unknown variances σ2x and
σ2y:
1. Determine the level of significance α and the critical value Za/2 such that Φ(Za/2) = 1− a/2,
where Φ(Z) is the standard normal distribution. Here, we pick α = 0.05, and thus the critical
value Z = 1.96
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2. Compute the means x and y, squared variances, s2x and s
2
y, of the samples
3. Compute the test statistic z = x−y√
s2x+s
2
y
100
4. If |z| > za/2, then reject the hypothesis. Otherwise, do not reject the hypothesis.
Then, if the hypothesis is rejected, two data set can be compared using the mean. Otherwise,
both data sets are considered having similar performance.
9.3 Results and Analysis
For each attack and countermeasure pair, 100 experiments were performed. The mean,
variance, and confident interval of the gain and lost for both attackers and power system operators
can be calculated using the payoff function described in Sec9.2.1.
The payoff matrices are shown in Tables 6 to 12. Tables 6 to 10 each presents the results for
one type of countermeasure against different attacks. After located the dominant attacks among all
countermeasures, Tables 11 and 12 present the dominant attack against different countermeasures.
The red cells in each table show the dominant attack strategy under different countermea-
sures. The attack ”Drop All PMUs” dominates all other attacks for any countermeasures. Table 11
shows the payoff matrix of all countermeasures against the attack ”Drop All PMUs”. The SCADA
system performs the best among all countermeasures. Please note that this study only focuses on
attacks against PMUs. As SCADA is also a cyber-physical system, it is possible for attackers to
attack the SCADA communication system, which is out of the scope of this paper.
Thus, the saddle point is found. Where the attacker can attack and drop all PMUs to force
the power system using SCADA.
However, in practice, the power system is a distributed system, it is difficult to successfully
take down all PMUs. Thus, we perform the analysis by considering less powerful attacks. We found
that, when ”Primary and Secondary PMUs” or fewer PMUs are attacked, the VSN performs the
best. With ”Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs” under attacked, SCADA performs better.
Table 12 shows the payoff matrix of all countermeasures against the second performed attack ”Drop
Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs”. In this scenario, the best mitigation strategy is using the
VSN.
When no attacks occur, simply use sixty to replace the missing data gives the best results.
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9.4 Summary
In this chapter, we performed game theory analysis on multiple attack and mitigation strat-
egy combinations. We identified that to achieve the best attack performance; the attacker should
drop as many PMUs as they can. When all PMUs in Primary Secondary and the Tertiary layer or
more are dropped, the SCADA system performs the best as the SCADA system is using a different
communication channel and not been affected. With all PMUs in the Primary and Secondary layer
or less are attacked, VSN provides the best solution. However, when no attack is presented, if only
one or two packets are delayed during normal operation, using sixty to fill the gap could be a bet-
ter solution. As mentioned in previous sections, attacking SCADA communication system is also
possible, which is not focused in this study. Further investigation is needed for the case of SCADA
system under attack.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions
10.1 Overview
With more penetration of renewable energy into the grid, the use of PMUs makes the power
system sensitive to communication network service quality. In this dissertation, we show multiple
synchrophasor network vulnerabilities as well as mitigations. With the proposed VSN solutions, the
resiliency of the power system is improved.
10.2 Chapter Summaries
10.2.1 Side-Channel analysis of PMU Traffic
Two side-channel vulnerabilities were discovered in the PMU to PDC connection. Those
vulnerabilities make it possible for attackers to identify encrypted synchrophasor data measurement
traffic without decryption. This further leads to the ability to drop certain PMU packets.
10.2.2 Traffic Camouflage
Traffic camouflage technique was proposed to evade the side-channel analysis mentioned
earlier. The traffic camouflage technique takes any traffic as input, and transfers the traffic into
another protocol. This technique makes it very difficult to identify the protected traffic.
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10.2.3 Denial of Service Attack on Phasor Measurement Unit
The effect of dropping PMU connections to the smart grid operation was investigated. The
experiment results show that, without any proper mitigation measurements, the power system will
quickly go unstable under such attack.
10.2.4 Virtual Synchrophasor Network
VSN was proposed to infer dropped PMU measurement data using historical data as well
as neighboring data. The proposed VSN technique is proven effective with one PMU under attack
for multiple seconds.
10.2.5 VSN Resiliency
The resiliency of VSN was further investigated in a larger system with more PMUs under
attack. In one test case, after 87% of the PMUs are disconnected, the VSN is still capable of
producing usable data for AGC.
10.2.6 Border Gateway Protocol Hijacking Detection
BGP hijacking attack and detection experiments bring the above-mentioned experiments to
the real Internet. During the experiments, the proposed method identified suspicious BGP hijacking
attacks.
10.2.7 Game Theory Analysis
The analysis results identified the best countermeasure and attack strategies. In the worst
attack scenario where all PMUs are disconnected, the SCADA system can be used to provide low-
resolution data. When all PMUs in the Primary and Secondary layer or less are attacked, the VSN
provides the best solution. When no attack is presented, using sixty to replace the occasional delayed
packet usually provides a good estimation.
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10.3 Future Research Directions
The following topics can be further investigated. As the SCADA system relying on network
communication, it is possible that the SCADA system has similar vulnerabilities. Virtual SCADA
network can be investigated using the CCN technology. The resiliency of VSN to power system
topology changes. A hybrid virtual system that combines the Virtual SCADA and VSN. More BGP
traffic experiments with more data point to get a more concrete conclusion about the BGP hijacking
detection methods.
10.4 Summary
In this dissertation, the side-channel vulnerabilities in PMU to PDC communication were
discovered. By exploit those vulnerabilities, DoS attacks were performed. Traffic camouflage was
proposed and implemented to evade side-channel analysis. VSN was proposed and evaluated to be
effective to mitigate DoS attacks against PMUs. The resiliency of the above mentioned VSN was
then evaluated. BGP hijacking attacks were performed to bring the above attack and mitigation
experiments to the real Internet. Finally, game theory analysis gives a full picture of the study and
concludes the best mitigation strategies under different attack scenarios.
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Appendix A Consequences and Mitigation of DoS Attack on
Single PMU with VSN
Table 1: Generator Rated values and power outputs
Rated (MW) Activate Reactive
Power (MW) Power (MVArs)
Generator G1 900 654 107
Generator G2 900 654 181
Generator G3 900 710 120
Generator G4 900 702 192
PV 210 88 0
Table 2: AGC Parameters
λR T k α1 α2
AGC 1 20 0.5 -0.007 0.5 0.5
AGC 2 20 0.5 -0.007 0.5 0.5
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Figure 1: Tie-line energy change ∆E in one minute window after a DoS attack under different
scenarios. Please note that the Countermeasure B and Countermeasure A case 2 in figure (a) are
overlapped. (a) Four or less packets are blocked. (b) Five or more packets are blocked.
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Figure 2: System responses after a fault. One packet from PMU 7 is blocked by a DoS attack. (a)
Frequency response at Bus 7. (b) Power generation of generator 2. (c) Power generation of generator
3. (d) Tie-line power flow.
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Figure 3: System responses after a fault. Five packets from PMU 7 are blocked by a DoS attack.
(a) Frequency response at Bus 7. (b) Power generation of generator 2. (c) Power generation of
generator 3. (d) Tie-line power flow.
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Figure 4: System responses after a fault. 100 packets from PMU 7 are blocked by a DoS attack.
(a) Frequency response at Bus 7. (b) Power generation of generator 2. (c) Power generation of
generator 3. (d) Tie-line power flow.
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Figure 5: System responses after a fault. Five packets from PMU 7 are blocked by a DoS attack with
Countermeasure A applied. (a) Frequency response at Bus 7. (b) Power generation of generator 2.
(c) Power generation of generator 3. (d) Tie-line power flow.
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Figure 6: System responses after a fault. 300 packets from PMU 7 are blocked by a DoS attack with
Countermeasure A applied. (a) Frequency response at Bus 7. (b) Power generation of generator 2.
(c) Power generation of generator 3. (d) Tie-line power flow.
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Figure 7: System responses after a fault. Five packets from PMU 7 are blocked by a DoS attack with
Countermeasure B applied. (a) Frequency response at Bus 7. (b) Power generation of generator 2.
(c) Power generation of generator 3. (d) Tie-line power flow.
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Figure 8: System responses after a fault. 300 packets from PMU 7 are blocked by a DoS attack with
Countermeasure B applied. (a) Frequency response at Bus 7. (b) Power generation of generator 2.
(c) Power generation of generator 3. (d) Tie-line power flow.
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Appendix B PhasorToolBox – A Python Package for Syn-
chrophasor Application Prototyping
In this section, a new synchrophasor software development package using Python3 is pro-
posed. The package collects and parses data from multiple synchrophasor devices using the protocol
defined in the IEEE C37.118-2011 standard [52], and provides easy-to-use interfaces for develop-
ment.
The Python programming language is infamous for its poor performance, specifically in
that it requires more resources than C and C++. For example, similar implementations of C++ are
much more efficient, which is a topic of discussion in this section. This proposed package overcomes
the performance issue through the use of single-threaded asynchronous programming, a customized
parser and a simplified configuration frame.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
SYNC FRAMESIZE
ID
CODE SOC FRACSEC Payload(Variable) CHK
32 Bytes
Figure 9: Synchrophasor message frame format. The size of payload varies depends on frame type
and the configuration frame. Please note the unit is byte.
B.1 Related Work
The OpenPDC [7] is a synchrophasor application that functions as a PDC and has many
features including interfaces for customized applications. Although OpenPDC is mostly implemented
in C#, which is no an ideal languages for research and prototyping given the lack of scientific archival
support and extensive development times1.
Matlab [73] is one of the most commonly used programs in the power system community for
research. It has many out-of-the-box tools for simulating a power system and capable of implement-
ing new applications including neural networks. There is an open source repository on the GitHub
supports parsing the synchrophasor protocol [79]. Despite these advantages, the regular updates to
Matlab, with a new version published annually combined with poor backward compatibility requires
that the user ensure compatibility prior to development.
1According to [7], the The language composition of OpenPDC is: C# 87.3%, SQLPL 7.6%, PLSQL 2.8%,
JavaScript 1.5%, Batchfile 0.3%, CSS 0.2%, Other 0.3%
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
x DGNMR 
x ANNMR
STAT PHASORS (4 or 8 bytes) ... PHASORS (4 or 8 bytes)
FREQ
(2 or 4 Bytes)
DFREQ 
(2 or 4 Bytes)
ANALOG
(2 or 4 Bytes) ...
ANALOG 
(2 or 4 Bytes)
DIGITAL … DIGITAL
x PHNMR
x NUM_PMU 
Figure 10: The payload format in a synchrophasor data frame. ‘NUM PMU ’, ‘PHNMR’, ‘ANNMR’,
and ‘DGNMR’ are obtained from the configuration frame. Please note the unit is byte.
One of the first few synchrophasor application toolkits created to help developers to imple-
ment synchrophasor applications in the LabView regime was created in 2013 [109]. Since that time,
many researchers have used that toolkit to prototype new ideas. The same authors later created
an enhanced version of the development toolkit, named BabelFish (BF) for the rapid prototyping
of Wide Area Monitoring Protection and Control (WAMPAC) applications in LabView, C++, and
Active X [8].
Packet sniffer packages in Python such as ‘pyshark’ [43] and ‘scapy’ [17] can parse syn-
chrophasor messages. However, those packages do not provide methods to connect and demand
data transmission from synchrophasor devices. Also, the performance of those packages are gener-
ally poor and sometimes not meet the requirement defined in the standard.
Rather than replace the OpenPDC or any other tools in different programming languages,
the purpose of this proposed Python package ensure that diversity of languages so that the commu-
nity may improve synchrophasor applications
B.2 Review of Synchrophasor Protocol
In this section, the synchrophasor message frame format and the communication methods
through IP network of the synchrophasor protocol is briefly reviewed. Please refer to the standard
for more details.
As of May 2018, the most recent version of the synchrophasor protocol is detailed in the
IEEE C37.118.2-2011 standard, which while modifying the standard for measuring the synchrophasor
keeps the synchrophasor communication protocol in place [5,52]. In this standard, the synchropha-
sor, measurement method, synchrophasor message frame formats, communication methods, and
their relative performance requirements are all defined. The C37.118.2-2011 standard superseded
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the C37.118-2005 standard [51] with a slight change in the definitions for some fields and added
the configuration three frame. The C37.118.2-2011 standard is compatible with the C37.118-2015
standard.
B.2.1 Message Frames
Four message frame types are defined in the standard: data, configuration, header, and
command. The data, configuration, and header frame types are transmitted from the data source
and the command frame is transmitted to the data source. The general format of a synchrophasor
message frame is shown in Fig. 9. Except for the variance of the format of payload varies on
the frame type, all other fields share the same format, and except for the data frame, all other
frames can be parsed based on the frame itself. There are three types of configuration frames,
‘CFG-1’, ‘CFG-2’, and ‘CFG-3’. ‘CFG-1’ frames contain all available fields a synchrophasor device
can provide, whereas ‘CFG-2’ frames contain currently available fields a synchrophasor device can
provide. Although the ‘CFG-3’ frame need not be implemented on synchrophasor device, the ‘CFG-
2’ frame must be implemented instead.
The format of the data frame is defined in the configuration frames, which contain informa-
tion on the number and names of stations, and the number, names and format for all measurements.
Thus, the configuration frame must be obtained by the receiver prior to parsing the data frames.
The format of the payload in a data frame is shown in Fig. 10, which contain measurements
from one or multiple stations. The number of stations is defined in the ‘NUM PMU’ field in the
configuration frame. In each station, ‘PHNMR’, ‘ANNMR’, and ‘DGNMR’ are defined in the related
fields in the configuration frame. The configuration frame also determines the format of each field.
B.2.2 Communication Methods for IP
Although either serial or IP communication is used to apply the synchrophasor protocol,
for purposes of this communication, the IP protocol is detailed here. There are four communication
methods used: the ‘TCP-only’ method, the ‘UDP-only’ method, the ‘TCP/UDP’ method, and the
‘Spontaneous Data Transmission’ method. A ‘server’ is defined as the device providing data, and a
‘client’ is defined as the device receiving data.
In the ‘TCP-only’ method, a single TCP connection is used to transfer all frame types. The
client must know the server’s IP address and TCP port.
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In the ‘UDP-only’ method, a single UDP channel is used to transfer all frame types. The
client must know the server’s IP address and UDP port.
In the ‘TCP/UDP’ method, the UDP channel is used to transfer data frames, and the TCP
connection is used to transfer all other frames. The client must know the server’s IP address and
TCP port, and the server must know the client’s receiving port. The client’s address is optional if
the UDP channel is using broadcast.
In the ‘Spontaneous Data Transmission’ method, the server sends data frames to a pre-
configured destination and port continuously without listening to any incoming traffic.
B.2.3 Communication Sequence
Ten types of commands are defined in three criteria in the C37.118.2- 2011 standard: i)
the ‘Turn off transmission of data frames’ ii) the ‘Turn on transmission of data frames’, and iii)
the ‘Send CFG-2 frame’. The commands for each are the three commands to start, the request
configuration frame, and the stop transmission respectively. The essential sequence to start and
stop a data transmission session using ‘TCP-only’, ‘UDP-only’, or the ‘TCP/UDP’ communication
method are shown in Fig. 11. In the ‘Spontaneous Data Transmission’ method, the data source
keeps sending data frames. The configuration information may or may not be transferred using the
‘CFG-2’ frame in the same channel in a constant interval.
Turn off transmission of data frames.Send CFG-2 frame.
Turn on transmission of data frames.
CFG-2 fram
e
Data frame
Data frame
Turn off transmission of data frames.
⋮
PDC PMU/PDC
Figure 11: The communication sequence of a data transmission session using the ‘TCP-only’, ‘UDP-
only’, and ’TCP/UDP’ communication methods.
B.2.4 Delays
Rather than providing a required time limit for message processing the C37.118.2-2011
standard instead provides an estimated delay for each link in the synchrophasor network. According
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to the standard, the PDC processing & alignment delay is in the range of 2ms to 2+s, and the
communication system I/O delay is in the range of 0.05ms to 30ms.
B.3 PhasorToolBox
In this section, the modules of the proposed package are introduced, followed by an example
configuration detailed at the end of this section.
The proposed package contains a parser module, a client module, and a PDC module, all of
which must be instantiated before use. Before introducing each of the modules, the asynchronous
programming technique is first introduced so that the client and PDC modules may communicate
with multiple servers concurrently without any multi-threaded programming overhead.
All modules provide detailed documentation-‘help(module name)’ for use in printing the
detailed usage of each module.
B.3.1 Parser Module
The parser module is a stand-alone module that provides a ‘parse’ method that takes a
binary string as input and returns a list of structured message frames. The returned list of structured
message frame provides an easy-to-use interface to obtain the value of any desired fields.
For any synchrophasor message frame, the ‘frame type’ and ‘id code’ can be obtained without
prior knowledge. Except for the data frame, the parser directly resolves the binary into the relative
structured message frame.
As described in Section B.2, the parsing of synchrophasor data frame does require a pri-
ori knowledge of the configurations, which means that a piece of memory is used to store resolved
configuration frames. If the ‘frame type’ is either ‘CFG-2’ or ‘CFG-3’ frame, then the resolved con-
figuration frame is stored in the parser’s memory. If the ‘frame type’ is ‘data’, then the information
in the resolved configuration frame with the same ‘id code’ is used to parse the data frame. If no
configuration frame with the same ‘id code’ found in the memory, the data frame is discarded. The
steps needed to parse a binary string and return the parsed frames are detailed in Fig. 12.
To observe the structure and the values of each field of a parsed message in the returned list,
the ‘show()’ method is used on the message. Assume that a list of 100 messages ‘msgs’ is received.
As shown in Fig. 13, part of the output of the ‘show()’ method applied on the 10th message by
executing the helper method ‘msgs[9].show()’. This method is used by developers to determine the
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End?
Stop
Parse 12 
Bytes
data?
CFG2?
CMD?
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parsed 
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No
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No
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No
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No
Yes
No
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No
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No
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No
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No
Figure 12: The flowchart of the parser module’s parsing method.
proper procedure for the ready acquisition of the desired values. For example, to get the frequency
value of the first PMU station in the 10th message, one can use ‘msgs[9].data.pmu data[0].freq’.
A feature of specific importance is the presentation of the phaser in the original data message
in either ‘rectangular’ or ‘polar’ format, that varies with the configuration frames. In the parsed
message, both presentation methods are available to the developer, and no further transformation
is needed.
B.3.2 Client Module
The client module is also a stand-alone module that requires the server and device IP codes
to function correctly. Different information is required depending upon the communication method,
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Figure 13: The output of ‘show()’ method.
however. This proposed client module supports all four communication methods.
The client module also has the ‘run’ and ‘callback’ methods within. The ‘run’ method
connects to a server to receive data and the ‘callback’ is an empty method that is executed upon
acquisition of a data frame. A developer can implement any method and assign that customized
function to the callback method. The user implemented function should take a parsed data frame as
input. The ‘run’ method takes a positive integer as an optional parameter to stop the execution and
close the connection after the number of time stamps(s) is(are) received. Without the parameter,
the ‘run’ method will run until a key interrupt is initiated.
Here is an example usage to connect to a TCP server:
from phasortoolbox import Client
pmu_client = Client(remote_ip='10.0.0.1',remote_port=4712, idcode=1, mode='TCP')
pmu_client.run(100)
:
After calling the ‘run’ method, once the client instance connected to the remote server, the
client instance automatically initiates the communication sequence described in Section B.2 to start
the data transmission. A parser instance embeds in the client instance continue with a parsing of
the received binary messages described in Section B.3.1. Once the client receives and successfully
parses a data frame, the callback method will be called with the argument of the parsed data frame.
By default, the callback method does not do anything. However, when the instance by
‘run’ method is initiated, the instance will attempt to connect the remote server. Although only
critical messages are displayed with the default log level, user can change the log level to ‘DEBUG’,
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which will provide more information for purposes of checking network availability. The output of a
successful but immediately closed connection with no data frame received is detailed in Fig 14. Here,
although the device is available and reachable through the network, either the ‘id code’ is incorrect
or the device is not a synchrophasor device. The following script can be used to change the logging
Figure 14: The logs while trying to connect a non synchrophasor device.
level:
import logging
logging.getLogger().setLevel(logging.DEBUG)
:
The coroutine methods ‘coro run’ and ‘coro close’ methods are provided for asynchronous
programming.
B.3.3 PDC Module
t0
t0-Δt
t0-2Δt
c1 c2 c3
t0
t0-Δt
t0-2Δt
c1 c2 c3
t0
t0-Δt
t0-2Δt
c1 c2 c3
t'0 t'1 t'2
t0
t0-Δt
t0-2Δt
t0-3Δt
c1 c2 c3
t0
t0-Δt
t0-2Δt
t0-3Δt
c1 c2 c3
t0
t0-Δt
t0-2Δt
t0-3Δt
c1 c2 c3
t0-4Δt t0-4Δt t0-4Δt
No data received
Data received
Synchrophasors returned to callback function
t'0 t'1 t'2
Case 1, synchrophasors in one time stamp are returned
Case 2, synchrophasors in three time stamps are returned
Figure 15: An illustration of the ‘buffer’ status change under different configurations. ‘t’ presents
the GPS time stamp of the measurement data. ‘∆t’ presents the timing interval between two
synchrophasor measurements. ‘t´ ’ presents the clock time. ‘c’ presents the client instances.
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The PDC module must work with client modules, specifically by gathering parsed frames
from the client instances, aligning the frames using the GPS time stamps and returning the aligned
synchrophasors.
A ‘run’ method is also within the PDC module, which is a coroutine wrapper. Upon
execution of the run method, all clients assigned to the PDC instance connect to their assigned
server for data retrieval
Similar to the Client module, the ‘run’ method takes a positive integer as an optional
parameter to halt the execution and close all connections after receiving the number of time stamps.
Without the parameter, the ‘run’ method will continue until a key interrupt.
Here is an example of an assigned series of client instances to a single PDC instance:
from phasortoolbox import Client, PDC
pmu_client1 = Client(remote_ip='10.0.0.1',remote_port=4712, idcode=1, mode='TCP')
pmu_client2 = Client(remote_ip='10.0.0.2',remote_port=4713, local_port=4713, idcode=2, mode='UDP')
pdc = PDC(clients=[pmu_client1, pmu_client2])
pdc.callback = lambda synchrophasors: print(synchrophasors[-1].time)
pdc.run()
:
Similar to the client module, a ‘callback’ method initiates when some synchrophasors are ready. For
some computations such as the use of multiple time stamps of synchrophasors to infer a near future
measurement, multiple time stamps of synchrophasors can be returned simultaneously. This option
can be changed by assigning a positive integer value to the ‘history’ option of the PDC instance to
the desired number of time stamps needed in each callback.
The ‘return on time out’ is a boolean flag that determines if a time stamp with not all
synchrophasors received should be returned upon time out. By default, only time stamps with all
synchrophasors received will be returned.
The returned time stamps are always in sequence with the last returned time stamps never
returned out of sequence. For example, if some synchrophasors with a older time stamp are created
after synchrophasors with a newer stamp are already sent, caused by possible network delays, the
synchrophasors with older time stamp that was just created will be held for a later return. This step
by step process is detailed in Fig. 15. In case 1, where the PDC is configured to return time stamps
in sequence, the synchrophasor with an older time stamp is not returned because a synchrophasor
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with more recent stamp was returned earlier. In case 2, where the PDC is configured to return three
time stamps simultaneously, the older time stamp is returned if synchrophasors with a more recent
time tag is also created.
The ‘coro run’ and ‘coro close’ coroutines are also provided for asynchronous programming.
B.3.4 The Callback Methods
The proposed development package provides a callback based interface in which the callback
method in the Client module and the PDC play key roles to fully utilize this proposed software
package fully. For a Client instance, the callback uses a single data frame as input, and for a PDC
instance, the callback takes a list of synchrophasors as input.
To solve complexed problems, a developer must define the required memory space and
parameters in another object, and implement a method for the object that uses as input that
measurement data to solve the problem. The method is then assigned to either a PDC or CLient
instance before running.
Please refer to the PhasorToolBox code repository for tutorials and examples of specific
uses.
B.3.5 An Example Architecture
An example synchrophasor network built with all three modules is detailed in Figure Fig.
16.
Server
(PMU)
TCP
UDP Parser
Callback
API
UDP
Parser
Callback
API
TCP 
Parser
Callback
API
Alignment 
Buffer
Callback
API
CFGs
CFGs
CFGs
Timer
Server
(PMU)
Server
(PMU)
TCP-only client
TCP/UDP client
Spontaneous data transmission client 
PDC
Example Architecture
⋮⋮ ⋮
Figure 16: An illustration of a synchrophasor network built with the proposed package.
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In the example setup, multiple remote servers are connected to the same number of client
instances that use one of the communication types concurrently. Depending upon the connection
method, the client module automates the connection and initializes a data transmission session.
The received binary messages are sent to the parser instance in the client instance. Then, the client
instances concurrently sends the parsed message to a PDC. The PDC aligns the received message
and then calls another callback function.
B.3.6 A Real-time Frequency Meter
The program presented in this section is an example implementation using the proposed
package. The program implemented a frequency meter that shows 300 historical frequency mea-
surements of two PMUs in real time. Fig. 17 shows the screen shot of the program interface while
running.
from phasortoolbox import PDC,Client
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import numpy as np
import logging
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.DEBUG)
class FreqMeter(object):
def __init__(self):
x = np.linspace(-10.0, 0.0, num=300, endpoint=False)
y = [60.0]*300
plt.ion()
self.fig = plt.figure()
ax = self.fig.add_subplot(211)
self.line1, = ax.plot(x, y)
plt.title('PMU1 Frequency Plot')
plt.xlabel('Time (s)')
plt.ylabel('Freq (Hz)')
ax = self.fig.add_subplot(212)
self.line2, = ax.plot(x, y)
plt.title('PMU2 Frequency Plot')
plt.xlabel('Time (s)')
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plt.ylabel('Freq (Hz)')
plt.tight_layout()
def update_plot(self, synchrophasors):
y_data = [[],[]]
for synchrophasor in synchrophasors:
for i, msg in enumerate(synchrophasor):
y_data[i].append(msg.data.pmu_data[0].freq)
self.line1.set_ydata(y_data[0])
self.line2.set_ydata(y_data[1])
self.fig.canvas.draw()
self.fig.canvas.flush_events()
if __name__ == '__main__':
pmu_client1 = Client(remote_ip='10.0.0.1',remote_port=4712, idcode=1, mode='TCP')
pmu_client2 = Client(remote_ip='10.0.0.2',remote_port=4713, local_port=4713, idcode=2, mode='UDP')
fm = FreqMeter()
pdc = PDC(clients=[pmu_client1,pmu_client2],history=300)
pdc.callback = fm.update_plot
pdc.run()
:
Figure 17: A screen shot of the real-time frequency meter example presented in Section B.3.6
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B.4 Performance Considerations
To develop this proposed concept, the authors chose Python, which is well known for its
short development time, rich package library, and most commonly used languages for research de-
velopment. Despite the deficiencies in performance, the short development time compensates for
the computing time, which was not a problem for general research. Given that most synchropha-
sor applications are usually time critical, three essential techniques were embedded in the proposed
package to improve performance: single-threaded asynchronous programming, a customized binary
parser, and a simplified configuration frame.
B.4.1 Single-Threaded Asynchronous Programming
Asynchronous execution refers to executing multiple tasks that are independent of each
other. One task can be started before another task is ended. Synchronous execution refers to ex-
ecuting multiple tasks that have dependencies. Tasks need to be executed in a specific order and
not overlap each other. For a program that can communicate with multiple remote nodes concur-
rently entails using asynchronous programming because the network packets are not guaranteed to
be delivered in order.
The traditional method for implementing asynchronous programming is using either multi-
threaded or multi-process programming on a multiple core computer. Multi-process programming
creates multiple processes, each with a different virtual memory space that can undertake simultane-
ous computing on multiple CPU cores. Such multi-threaded programming creates multiple threads
sharing the same virtual memory. Here, the operating system schedules the execution of each thread
or process with any switches between thread or processes causing overhead in the form of context
switches. Both methods work well for a computation-heavy program because the simultaneous
computation using multiple CPU cores can reduce the completion time if the program is written
correctly.
However, when using a physical interface for gathering data from multiple synchrophasor
devices, the computational load is light. Although the system input/output(I/O), such as the
write/read to disk, or wait for a network packet to receive, is quite time-consuming, it requires a
minimum of computation. Indeed the time required for such calculations is much less than that
required for packages to receive and switch between threads or processes when multi-threading or
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multi-processing is used.
The proposed package uses a single thread to implement the asynchronous programming
pattern. Rather than halting the CPU and waiting for the I/O task to finish, single-threaded
asynchronous programming releases the CPU to work on the next scheduled task while waiting for
the physical interface to finish the I/O task, and return to the unfinished I/O task at a later time.
This concept is similar to the creation of multiple threads, each of which is assigned a small and
easy task without the context switch overhead while using multi-threading or multi-processing.
However, single-threaded synchronous programming is not as straightforward as multi-
threaded programming. The switch between tasks needs to be manually assigned. In Python,
the functions that are executed asynchronously are known as a ‘coroutine’, which is scheduled using
an ‘event loop.’ The proposed package provides both wrapper API that acts like standard protocols
for easier programming and coroutine API for advanced implementation.
In the early development stage of the proposed package, the switch from multi-threading
to single-threaded asynchronous programming reduced the average latency of processing one syn-
chrophasor message by 90%.
B.4.2 Kaitai Struct
Kaitai Struct is a declarative language used for describing various binary data structures, and
the proposed package’s Parser module was developed with this language [?]. Although other parsers
are available that can parse the synchrophasor messages, most have a less than ideal performance,
hence our rationale for developing this proposed package. Indeed, the substitution of the binary
parsing methods within Python to the Kaitai Struct defined-parser reduced the parsing time by
90%.
B.4.3 Minimized Configure Frame
Minimized Configure Frame is a customized data structure that uses the minimum required
information in a configuration frame for later parsing of a data frame. Three options are available
for managing the dynamically defined data frame packet structure: a) an ‘on the fly’ program
recompile; b) an attachment of the configuration frame binary in front of every data frame; c) and
the use of the variable in the parsed configuration frame to parse the data frames. Although Option
A provides the best performance, it is characterized by poor code readability and reusability. Option
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B, however, while providing the best code readability exhibits the poorest performance in that the
same configuration frame is parsed every time a data frame is received. Finally, Option C, while
striking a good balance between both Options A and B, is hindered by the latency of the inquiring
values from the massive structure of a configuration frame. Thus, in the proposed software package,
a minimized data structure with only the necessary information and minimum depth is created and
used as an input to parse data frames. This change from the original configuration frame to a
minimized configuration frame reduced the average parsing time reduced by 30%.
B.4.4 Performance Test
A performance test program is implemented using the proposed software package. The
test was performed in the Real-Time Power and Intelligent Systems (RTPIS) Lab [92] at Clemson
University. The subject was a computer with Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-1620 v2 @ 3.70GHz CPU, 8GB
Ram, 500GB HDD and 1 Gigabit Ethernet port.
The latency to synchronize all synchrophasors is measured, which is considered as the time
difference between the last data frame received until the user-defined callback function begins, as
shown in Fig. 18.
tGPS tlast_arrive tcallback
The time span of PMUs 
sending data frames
Latency to align the 
received synchrophasors
tfirst_arrive
Time
The time span of PDC 
receiving data frames
Figure 18: The timeline of events related to one synchronized synchrophasor measurements. The
‘Latency to synchronize the received synchrophasors ’ is considered as the time difference between
the last data frame received until the user-defined callback function is started.
Table 5: The latency test results
Communication Mean Standard Min Max
Method (ms) Deviation(ms) (ms) (ms)
TCP/UDP 0.3208 0.0804 0.1411 0.9198
UDP 0.3078 0.0649 0.1345 0.7950
Spontaneous
TCP 0.3277 0.1324 0.1415 25.2840
The latency time series of the tests are shown in Figs. 19, 20, and 21 respectively. The
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Figure 19: The time series of latencies caused by the proposed package. In this test, 15 PMUs are
connected, one hour of data is collected. All PMUs are using TCP/UDP communication method.
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Figure 20: The time series of latencies caused by the proposed package. In this test, 15 PMUs are
connected, one hour of data is collected. All PMUs are using UDP Spontaneous Data Transmission
communication method.
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Figure 21: The time series of latencies caused by the proposed package. In this test, 15 PMUs are
connected, one hour of data is collected. All PMUs are using TCP communication method.
mean, standard deviation, minimum delay, and maximum delay over the one hour test are calculated
and shown in Table 5.
Three tests are conducted. Each test uses a different communication method. In each test,
15 PMUs are connected using the Client module. Data are collected and synchronized using the
PDC module. One hour of data is collected.
Although the average of the delay of the proposed Python package meets the IEEE Std
C37.118 requirement after applying our techniques, this package is intended for prototyping and not
for critical applications in production. As shown in Figs. 19, 20, and 21, the delays are changing
over time, and there are delays over 2ms occasionally. Thus, user needs to pay extra attention when
using the proposed package for timing sensitive application implementation. Also, due to the nature
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of the Python language, there are many behaviors could surprise a less experienced programmer,
such as underflow problems.
B.5 Conclusion
The PhasorToolBox simplifies all required efforts to connect to remote synchrophasor de-
vices, acquire data, parse data and align the data frames in minimum delay and complexity. More
importantly, the PhasorToolBox provides a very easy-to-use interface for development, and over-
comes the performance issue of the Python programming language so that developers may quickly
prototype new ideas that utilize Python’s full potential. For the source code of the proposed package
and more examples, please refer to [125].
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Appendix C Game Theory Analysis Payoff Matrices
Table 6: Use Zero for AGC
Attack/Countermeasure PMUs Mean Variance Confidence Interval
No Attack All PMUs 105.91 355238.25 120.11
Drop PMUs PMU 8 143818.63 28654.14 34.11
Drop PMUs Primary PMUs 1581714.13 2661952.09 328.79
Drop PMUs Primary and Secondary PMUs 3595413.76 8932540.53 602.28
Drop PMUs Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs 5609022.12 21081720.96 925.27
Drop PMUs All PMUs 8341974.82 43433784.32 1328.09
BGP Hijacking PMU 8 143681.50 56065.04 47.72
BGP Hijacking Primary PMUs 1566895.99 259496534.78 3246.23
BGP Hijacking Primary and Secondary PMUs 3578841.06 345333562.32 3744.84
BGP Hijacking Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs 5590011.64 463871542.63 4340.23
BGP Hijacking All PMUs 8319940.70 643699682.04 5112.76
Random Delay PMU 8 107604.23 1688223.92 261.84
Random Delay Primary PMUs 1172045.66 433445273.68 4195.48
Random Delay Primary and Secondary PMUs 2683735.88 1154281958.74 6846.52
Random Delay Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs 4195095.35 2349700630.99 9768.33
Random Delay All PMUs 6237060.23 6393221673.95 16112.91
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Table 7: Use Sixty for AGC
Attack/Countermeasure PMUs Mean Variance Confidence Interval
No Attack All PMUs 0.00 0.00 0.01
Drop PMUs PMU 8 14.81 11.22 0.68
Drop PMUs Primary PMUs 165.66 1451.41 7.68
Drop PMUs Primary and Secondary PMUs 379.88 7580.86 17.55
Drop PMUs Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs 587.77 17863.49 26.93
Drop PMUs All PMUs 910.14 44347.35 42.44
BGP Hijacking PMU 8 14.80 11.22 0.67
BGP Hijacking Primary PMUs 164.32 1487.23 7.77
BGP Hijacking Primary and Secondary PMUs 378.36 7673.94 17.65
BGP Hijacking Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs 586.01 18001.55 27.04
BGP Hijacking All PMUs 908.09 44664.44 42.59
Random Delay PMU 8 11.09 6.22 0.50
Random Delay Primary PMUs 123.10 837.15 5.83
Random Delay Primary and Secondary PMUs 284.08 4419.51 13.40
Random Delay Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs 439.02 10176.69 20.33
Random Delay All PMUs 680.63 24795.84 31.73
Table 8: Use The Last Available Data for AGC
Attack/Countermeasure PMUs Mean Variance Confidence Interval
No Attack All PMUs 0.01 0.00 0.01
Drop PMUs PMU 8 12.00 107.73 2.09
Drop PMUs Primary PMUs 134.12 12455.54 22.49
Drop PMUs Primary and Secondary PMUs 313.00 68904.99 52.90
Drop PMUs Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs 484.22 165054.78 81.87
Drop PMUs All PMUs 788.55 399174.67 127.32
BGP Hijacking PMU 8 3.93 10.87 0.66
BGP Hijacking Primary PMUs 46.00 1409.27 7.57
BGP Hijacking Primary and Secondary PMUs 120.23 9815.27 19.96
BGP Hijacking Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs 169.77 18505.40 27.41
BGP Hijacking All PMUs 326.97 56712.49 47.99
Random Delay PMU 8 3.04 6.58 0.52
Random Delay Primary PMUs 35.11 835.90 5.83
Random Delay Primary and Secondary PMUs 92.02 5841.47 15.40
Random Delay Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs 130.41 11194.89 21.32
Random Delay All PMUs 249.33 33344.08 36.80
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Table 9: Use SCADA for AGC
Attack/Countermeasure PMUs Mean Variance Confidence Interval
No Attack All PMUs 0.02 0.02 0.02
Drop PMUs PMU 8 7.09 31.45 1.13
Drop PMUs Primary PMUs 75.79 3675.06 12.22
Drop PMUs Primary and Secondary PMUs 189.45 22708.65 30.37
Drop PMUs Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs 288.55 50991.74 45.51
Drop PMUs All PMUs 503.88 137241.01 74.65
BGP Hijacking PMU 8 7.08 31.44 1.13
BGP Hijacking Primary PMUs 75.72 3672.25 12.21
BGP Hijacking Primary and Secondary PMUs 189.34 22698.51 30.36
BGP Hijacking Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs 288.39 50967.60 45.49
BGP Hijacking All PMUs 503.66 137189.76 74.64
Random Delay PMU 8 5.31 17.71 0.85
Random Delay Primary PMUs 56.83 2080.11 9.19
Random Delay Primary and Secondary PMUs 142.50 12832.20 22.83
Random Delay Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs 216.54 28769.45 34.18
Random Delay All PMUs 377.68 77328.36 56.04
Table 10: Use VSN for AGC
Attack/Countermeasure PMUs Mean Variance Confidence Interval
No Attack All PMUs 0.03 0.03 0.04
Drop PMUs PMU 8 3.66 9.12 0.61
Drop PMUs Primary PMUs 44.15 1166.56 6.88
Drop PMUs Primary and Secondary PMUs 140.92 9996.10 20.15
Drop PMUs Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs 310.91 31419.84 35.72
Drop PMUs All PMUs 1721.53 86590.37 59.30
BGP Hijacking PMU 8 3.65 9.12 0.61
BGP Hijacking Primary PMUs 44.10 1167.40 6.89
BGP Hijacking Primary and Secondary PMUs 140.81 10000.40 20.15
BGP Hijacking Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs 310.63 31433.89 35.73
BGP Hijacking All PMUs 1717.11 85216.61 58.83
Random Delay PMU 8 2.74 5.12 0.46
Random Delay Primary PMUs 33.06 652.41 5.15
Random Delay Primary and Secondary PMUs 105.61 5607.97 15.09
Random Delay Primary Secondary and Tertiary PMUs 233.22 17664.14 26.78
Random Delay All PMUs 1287.54 48676.64 44.46
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Table 11: Drop All PMUs
Countermeasures Mean Variance Confidence Interval
Use Zero for AGC 8341974.82 43433784.32 1328.09
Use Sixty for AGC 910.14 44347.35 42.44
Use the Last Received Value for AGC 788.55 399174.67 127.32
Use SCADA for AGC 503.88 137241.01 74.65
Use VSN for AGC 1721.53 86590.37 59.30
Table 12: Drop Primary and Secondary PMUs
Countermeasures Mean Variance Confidence Interval
Use Zero for AGC 3595413.76 8932540.53 602.28
Use Sixty for AGC 379.88 7580.86 17.55
Use the Last Received Value for AGC 313.00 68904.99 52.90
Use SCADA for AGC 189.45 22708.65 30.37
Use VSN for AGC 140.92 9996.10 20.15
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